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NEGOTIABILITY OF CORPORATE BONDS-RECENT NEW
YORK LEGISLATION
LEGISLATION designed to assure the negotiability of corporate
bonds has recently been adopted in New York., The new law
takes the form of an amendment to the Hofstadter Act 2 passed
in 1926 to render interim certificates negotiable.3 This Act as
now amended defines a corporate bond in Section 260 (3) as:
"... any bond, debenture, note or other written corporate ob-
ligation, forming part of a series of similar bonds, debentures,
notes or other written corporate obligations, issued under or the
payment of which is secured by a mortgage or deed of trust...
or issued under or secured by a collateral trust agreement or any
other indenture identified or described in such obligation; and
any certificate of a trustee, whether or not so issued or secured,
forming part of a series of similar trustee's certificates, which
evidences the right to a share or part of any specified corporate
obligation or obligations and the security relating thereto, if
there be any such security; and any interest coupon appertaining
to any of the foregoing described instruments."
3N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1930) art. 8, §§ 260-2G2.
2 N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW (1926) art. 8, §§ 260-262. This Act, as it
was before the present amendment, may be found in N. Y. CoNs. Lkivs
(Cahill, 1928 Supp.) c. 42, §§ 260-262.
33The Court of Appeals in Manhattan Co. -. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38, 150
N. E. 594 (1926), held interim certificates entitling the bearer to certain
bonds -when, as and if received by the signer to be non-negotiable because
of the requirements of § 1 of the N. I. L. that "an instrument to be
negotiable .. . must contain an unconditional promise ... to pay a sum
certain in money." Security receipts being generally dealt in as if negoti-
able, the ensuing agitation among lawyers and investment bankers re-
sulted in the Hofstadter Act, intended to make such receipts negotiable.
The Manhattan case was clearly in accord with prior decisions. Babcock
v. National Surety Co., 106 Misc. 149, 175 N. Y. Supp. 432 (Sup. Ct,
1919), atFd, 190 App. Div. 941, 179 N. Y. Supp. 909 (1st Dep't 1920) (pur-
chaser in good faith from thief obtained no title against former owner);
Orth v. Bell, 215 App. Div. 738, 212 N. Y. Supp. 720 (3d Dep t 1925)
(receipts non-negotiable under N. I. L.). See Economic Developing Co. v.
General Chinaware Corp., 200 N. Y. Supp. 228, 229 (Sup. Ct. 1923) (estop-
pel necessary to sustain negotiability). Cf. Security National Bank v.
Peoples Bank, 287 Mo. 464, 230 S. W. 87 (1921) (receipts for Liberty
Bonds held negotiable by Act of Congress); Bowie v. National City Bank,
122 Wash. 269, 210 Pac. 498 (1922) (receipt for certificate of deposit not
negotiable); Hearne v. Gillette, 151 La. 79, 91 So. 634 (1922) (security
receipt not negotiable); Radke v. Liberty Insurance Co., 37 Idaho 436,
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Corporate bonds, 4 as thus defined, are placed on the same foot-
ing as interim receipts.
The amendment in question was quite evidently prompted by
the latest pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in Enoch v.
Brtndon= 5 that the negotiability of corporate bonds is to be
216 Pac. 1040 (1923) (receipts for bonds not negotiable). The Manhattan
case was widely noted. Note (1926) 12 CORN. L. Q. 97; (1926) 35 YAML
L. J. 877; Note (1926) 39 HARv. L. REV. 875; Note (1926) 74 U. OF PA.
L. REV. 727. For a later case reaching a contrary result, see Hopple v.
Cleveland Discount Co., 25 Ohio App. 138, 157 N. E. 414 (1927).
4 Unless otherwise noted, the term "corporate bond" is used throughout
this note in the broad sense set forth in the amendment.
It will be noted that practically every requirement of § 1 of the N. I. L,
is abrogated in respect to the defined instruments. The definition elimi-
nates all matters of certainty of amount or time of payment, disregards
the possible presence of express conditions to a right to payment, and is
so phrased as to embrace promises to do other acts than to pay money.
Compare the bonds held non-negotiable in the following early cases: Knight
v. Wilmington & Manchester R. R., 1 Jones 357 (N. C. 1854) (additional
promise not of money); McClelland v. Norfolk Southern R. R., 110 N. Y.
469, 18 N. E. 237 (1888) (provision for extending time of payment on
contingency not within control of holders); Ledwich v. McKim, 53 N. Y.
307 (1873) (stolen, incomplete bond); Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434,
439 (1878) (uncertainty of amount); Chouteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 290
(1879) (uncertainty of time of payment); Jackson v. Vicksburg, S. &
T. R. R., Fed. Cas. No. 7150, at 257 (C. C. La. 1876). (uncertainty of
place of payment); Augusta Bank v. Augusta, 49 Me. 507, 517 (1860)
(no words of negotiability). That the N. I. L. should never have been
thought to apply to bonds, see Note (1925) 25 COL. L. REV. 71; Note (1926)
39 HARV. L. REV. 875; BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUDIENTS LAW (4th ed.,
1926) vi., 7-8; 2 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS (1908) § 1740A.
As defined in the amendment any corporate obligation becomes "negoti-
able" if issued in a series under some sort of security device. Unsecured
bonds, however, apparently not covered by this law, are sometimes issued.
Moreover, it seems strange that perpetual bonds, to become due only on
exercise of the obligor's option as set forth in an accompanying indenture
charging the obliger's income with merely the payment of interest, should
be "negotiable" while an unsecured bond payable to J. S. is non-negotiable
for lack of the word "order." As for a bearer bond, registered by exercise
of the option therein, only the terms of § 261 (1), infra note 86, prevent
it from being made "negotiable" by this statute. In such a case, the bond,
since it provides for payment "to the bearer, or, if registered, to the
registered holder," no longer "by its terms" entitles "the bearer to the
benefits thereof" and so is not "negotiable." The case excluded by the
requirement of an issue in series is that of one large obligation delivered
to a trustee. There is no intention or usage of negotiability in this situa-
tion, and the restriction seems reasonable.
5249 N. Y. 263, 164 N. E. 45 (1928), r'ev'g 224 App. Div. 692, 228 N. Y.
Supp. 789 (4th Dep't 1928), and aff'g 128 Misc. 695, 220 N. Y. Supp. 294
(Sup. Ct. 1927). In this case certain coupon bonds contained a promise to
pay the bearer in 1941. The bonds bore provisions for redemption and
acceleration and referred to the trust mortgage "for a description of the
property mortgaged and pledged, the nature and extent of the security,
the rights of the holders of the bonds with respect thereto, the manner in
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determined solely by considering whether the formal requisites
of Section 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law r are satisfied
and that the attempt to insure "negotiability by contract" was
unavailing7 The holding that the negotiability of corporate
bonds depends upon compliance with the first section of the
Negotiable Instruments Law finds ample support in prior New
York 8 and other state 9 court decisions. But the dictum nega-
which notice may be given to such holders and the terms and conditions
under which said bonds are issued and secured.' There was a further
provision that they were "to be treated as negotiable" and all persons
were "invited by the company to act accordingly." Certain of the bonds
were stolen from the plaintiff and negotiated before maturity ta the de-
fendant, a bonw fide puchaser for value. In a suit for the bonds or their
value, judgment for the defendant in the trial court was affirmed. The
court held the bonais to be negotiable under the N. I. L. § 1 to which any
instrument must conform to be negotiable; the reference on the bond to
the trust mortgage was regarded as relating only to the security and not
as rendering the promise to pay conditional.
G Except where noted the original numbering of the Uniform Law is
followed.
7 "True, to become negotiable, an instrument need not follow any precise
language.... But it must conform to the definition specified in Section 20
[N. I. L. § 1]. In the face of a command so explicit we must adhere to
the design of the Legislature." Andrews, J., 249 N. Y. 263, 266, 164 N. E.
45, 46.
8 Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907) (bond payable
only out of joint assets of a joint stock association regarded as a promise
on general credit of quasi-corporate entity and thus negotiable under
N. I. L.); Higgins v. Hocking Valley Ry., 188 App. Div. 684, 1'77 N. Y.
Supp. 444 (1st Dep't 1919) (reference to mortgoge for statement of se-
curity and acceleration provisions not a qualification of the promise to
pay, bond negotiable under N. L L.); cf. Morris v. Muir, 111 Misc. 739,
181 N. Y. Supp. 913 (Mun. Ct. 1920), aff'd, 191 App. Div. 947, 181 N. Y.
Supp. 945 (1st Dep't 1920) (bona ftdes of bond purchaser determined by
N. I. L.); Interboro Brewing Co. v. Doyle, 165 App. Div. 646, 151 N. Y.
Supp. 325 (3d Dep't 1915) (pledgees of bonds held bona fide holders under
N. I. L.). Compare also cases, supra note 3, applying the N. I. L. to
interim certificates. It must be remarked that only such cases as hold
the bonds non-negotiable can be strictly regarded as holdings on the point
inasmuch as the common law would regard the bonds in question as negoti-
able without reference to the N. I. L. BR-NNAN, op. cit. sztpra note 4, at '7.
9 The following decisions apply the N. I. L. to questions involving the
negotiability of bonds. Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mlass. 256, 119 N. E. 001
(1918) (broker selling stolen bonds in good faith not guilty of conversion
since bonds were held negotiable); Dengler v. Paul, 83 Pa. Sup. Ct. 37
(1924) (same); Crum v. Hanna, 140 Va. 366, 125 S. E. 219 (1924)
(maker's defense of fraud unavailable against holder in due course);
Nickey v. Lonsdale Mfg. Co., 149 Tenn. 1, 257 S. W. 403 (1924) (holder
in due course permitted to enforce payment of bonds held negotiable, though
pledged to him in breach of faith); King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 Minn.
481, 198 N. W. 798 (1924) (particular reference in bonds to terms of
trust mortgage held to render them non-negotiable); Grosfield v. First
National Bank, 73 Mont. 219, 236 Pac. 250 (1925) (Liberty Bonds held
negotiable); Manker v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co., 131 Wash.
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tiving" the possibility of insuring "negotiability by contract"-
a possibility suggested by Judge Cardozo in Manhattan Co. v.
Morgan 10 decided two years previously-revealed more clearly
than ever before that the ultimate decision as to the negotiability
of corporate bonds was to be determined by a judicial interpre-
tation of the formal nature of various clauses contained in the
instrument rather than by the clear intent of the draftsman."
Commercial necessity demands a high degree of certainty as to
whether specific bonds are negotiable.u The present legislation
is a hurried attempt to attain this certainty by eliminating the
formal requirements of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Al-
though the amendment probably obviates most questions of
form,13 its brevity and loose wording leave the legal effect of
the "negotiability" conferred a matter of speculation in many
respects.
The attributes of the "negotiability" with which corporate
bonds are now endowed in New York are apparently to be
found set forth entirely within the terms of the amendment in
430, 230 Pac. 406 (1924) (municipal bonds payable only out of future
assessments held non-negotiable and bona fide purchaser refused protection
against former owner); Jones v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co.,
139 Wash. 598, 247 Pac. 1017 (1926) (same); Montvale v. Peoples Bank,
74 N. J. L. 464, 67 Atl. 6T (1907) (protection accorded holder in duo
course of stolen municipal bonds); Adrian v. Whitney National Bank, 180
Mich. 171, 146 N. W. 654 (1914) (same); Linbarger v. Board of Educa-
tion, 83 N. J. L. 446, 85 Atl. 235 (1912) (lack of delivery no defense when
negotiable bonds came to hands of holder in due course) ; Stevens v. Berk-
shire Street Ry., 247 Mass. 399, 142 N. E. 59 (1924) (bonds negotiable,
demand unnecessary before suit against primary party); Irwin v. Bed-
ford County, 151 Tenn. 402, 270 S. W. 81 (1925) (county refused defense
of irregularity of issue against bona fide bondholders) ; Brokaw v. Kunzo,
127 Wash. 593, 221 Pac. 590 (1923) (pledgee of bonds held holder in due
course and entitled against true owner); Parks v. Hughes, 157 La. 914,
103 So. 261 (1925) (N. L L. requirement of good faith applied to bond
purchase); Brown v. Southwestern Farm Mortgage Co., 112 Kan. 192,
210 Pac. 658 (1922); Bank of California v. National City Co., 138 Wash.
517, 244 Pac. 690, on rehearing 141 Wash. 243, 251 Pac. 561 (1926) (bond
conforming with N. L L. requirements held negotiable for all purposes).
IoSupra note 3. See also infra note 22.
- Acceleration clauses, redemption and release provisions, tax allow-
ances, reference to a collateral deed of trust, powers of registration, are a
few typical examples of provisions contained in corporate indentures which
might render such instruments non-negotiable under § 1 of the N. I. L.
In King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, supra note 9, a provision for alteration by
the trustee of the bondholder's rights led the court to declare the bonds
non-negotiable under the above section.
12 Bonds have long been dealt in as negotiable. The practice was well
established in 1864. Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110 (U. S. 1864); Aiglor,
Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments (1924) 24 CoL. L.
REv. 563, 582; 2 MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 4, at §§ 1730, 1737, 1740A.
's Supra note 4.
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question. Yet the statement that the amendment renders cor-
porate bonds "negotiable" 1- indicates little as to its operative
effect. The adjective may mean only that they are transferable
so as to enable the transferee to sue thereon in his own name,
as under the early statutes making bills of lading "negotiable." 1
As used in the later Bills of Lading, Warehouse Receipts and
Stock Transfer Acts, it may mean that indorsement and deliv-
ery to a bona fide purchaser for value will cut off former own-
ers' equities based on fraud, duress, mistake and the like, and
give the purchaser the vendor's warranty of genuineness, yet
neither make the indorser contingently liable for performance
by the signer nor affect in any way the signer's liability
thereon.' 6 If the term "negotiable" is used as in the Negotiable
Instruments Law, it may mean that an indorser becomes liable
for payment on default of the maker, and that where such an
instrument is transferred to a holder in due course, so-called
"personal" defenses of the maker are cut off.17
The inclusion of bonds in the category of security receipts,
special instruments with a unique history, form and function,
'4 The amended Act nowhere explicitly provides that bonds are to be
"negotiable," but it does declare that the law "shall not be construed to
limit or impair the negotiability . . . of any instrument whether or not
defined herein. ' § 262, infra note 21. Furthermore, § 261, governing the
mode and effect of transfer, is entitled 'egotiation," 'and it is provided,
§ 260, that the "character" of any of the defined instruments is not to be
affected "by the inclusion therein of other provisions not limiting
the negotiable quality thereof as in this article provided." That "negoti-
ability" is the objective may be assumed.
"5 Bills and notes "may be transferred by indorsement and delivery ...
and the capability of being thus transferred, so as to give the indorsee
a right to sue on the contract in his own name, is what constitutes nego-
tiability." Then after speaking of the liability of an indorser and the
cutting off of the maker's defenses by negotiation, "a bona fide purchaser
for value paid acquires title to it even as against the true owner. . . .
But none of these consequences are necessary attendants or constituents
of negotiability, or negotiation. That may exist without them." Strong,
J., in Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 557, 563 (1879). See also Anderson
v. Portland Flouring Dill Co., 37 Ore. 483, 489, 60 Pac. 839, 842 (1900).
The ancient example is cited that an overdue promissory note is "negotia-
ble" but a transferee nevertheless takes subject to defenses and equities.
16 Bills of lading. N. Y. PERSONAL PROPEMTY LAW, art. 7 (Uniform Bills
of Lading Act) §§ 214-224. Warehouse receipts. N. Y. GENERAL BusI-
NESS LAW, art. 9 (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act) §§ 121-131. Stock
certificates are usually referred to as quasi-negotiable. Aigler, op. cit.
supra note 12, at 584; N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, art. 6 (Uniform
Stock Transfer Law) §§ 162-172.
.7 As in the case of bills, notes and other instruments negotiable within
the meaning of the N. I. L. Cf. Odell v. Gray, 15 Mo. 337, 342 (1851);
BIGELow, BiLLs, NOTES & CHECKS (3d ed. 1928) §§ 52-53. The word
"negotiable" is sometimes used merely to indicate that the form of the
instrument comnlies with the requirements of § 1 of the N. I. L.
1930]
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makes it difficult to determine, at the very outset, what elements
of "negotiability" were intended. In marked contrast to such
acts as the Negotiable Instruments and Stock Transfer Laws,
which set out in minute detail the particular qualities of the
instruments governed, the present law declares in a most in-
definite fashion in Section 261 (3) 18 that:
"A person to whom title may be transferred, as in this sec-
tion provided, and who shall have taken any such instrument
from any other person for present or antecedent value and with-
out notice of prior defenses or equities or claims of ownership
enforceable against such other person, shall have absolute title
thereto free of any defenses enforceable against or claims of
ownership of the signer or any prior holder." 10
The word "defenses" in the foregoing section of the amend-
ment is a broad one, and, used in such an unqualified manner,
may well be construed to include limitations placed upon the
rights of the bondholders by the very terms of the bond. Cor-
porations issuing bonds frequently limit their own liability with
respect to the bondholders.2 0 It seems likely and desirable that
18 Other apposite sections are set forth below. § 261 (1), infra note 36,
provides for transfer of title of bearer instruments by delivery by any
person in possession thereof; § 261(2), infra note 47, provides for transfer
of title of instruments payable to a named person by indorsement fol-
lowed by such delivery. § 261 (4), infra note 51, provides: ". . . this
section [§ 261 (1) (2) (3) ] shall not be applicable . . ." to overdue in.
struments.
19 The inartificiality of the statute is shown by the qualification of "ab-
solute title" as "free of any defenses enforceable against . . . the signer."
It seems impossible to invent a meaning for this. The signer does not
sue upon his own bond; the holder neither needs nor has a defense to
such a suit; and assuming the possibility of an occurrence of these two
anomalies, why should a holder of "absolute title" be precluded from
raising his defense?
Commenting on the Section as applied to security receipts, one writer
has objected to the unfamiliarity of the phrase "antecedent value" and
the omission of "equities" in the enumeration of immunities attaching to
an "absolute title." Note (1926) 26 CoL. L. RBu. 884, 886-87. The latter
objection seems met by the same writer's suggestion that "defenses" in-
clude "equities."
20 In Enoch v. Brandon, supra note 5, for example, there was a provision
allowing 75% of the holders to sanction the release of the company and
mortgaged property from the principal and interest due, and to alter the
rights of the bondholders against the company. Or there may be a pro-
vision that the time of payment may be extended on some contingency, as
in McClelland v. Norfolk Southern R. R., supra note 4; or that members
of a joint-stock association shall incur no personal liability on the issue,
as in Hibbs v. Brown, supra note 8; or that no foreclosure suit shall be
brought by the holders, except through the trustee on request of a named
proportion of the holders, as in McGeorge v. Big Stone Gap Imp. Co., 57
Fed. 262 (C. C. W. D. Va. 1893); or that interest is payable out of in-
come as declared by the directors, as in Strauss v. United Telegram Co.,
[Vol. 40
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such limitations will be regarded as "defenses" in so far as no-
tice thereof on the face of a corporate bond will be required in
order for a corporation successfully to limit its liability against
remote transferees. But if such limitations be regarded as "de-
fenses," under the wording of the amendment, there arises the
possibility that no purchaser may take such a bond "free of
any... claim of ownership of... any prior holder" since "ab-
solute title" is conditioned upon a taking "without notice of
prior defenses ... enforceable against" his transferor31  Sim-
ilarly, notice, actual or constructive, of some partial defense of
the corporation, such as a very slight failure of consideration,
might leave a purchaser in the best of good faith without "title"
sufficiently "absolute" to resist hidden claims of omership on
the part of others in the chain of prior holders. 2
164 Mlass. 130, 41 N. E. 57 (1895) and Corcoran v. Chesapeake & Ohio
'Canal Co., 8 D. C. 358 (1S74). In the cases cited supra notes 8 and 9,
the balance sought to be struck throughout by the draftsmen lay between
sufficient conformity with the N. I. L. to retain "negotiability" to make
the bonds salable, sufficient security provision to induce bankers to under-
write the issue, and sufficient limitations on the liability of the cor-
poration to protect it from embarrassment by sudden and heavy de-
mands.
21 This is particularly unfortunate, since the primary purpose of the law
seems to have been to protect holders against claims of former ownership.
The cases evidently calling the law into being questioned the title of a
holder in due course as against a former owner from whom the instru-
ment was stolen; the same question is involved in most cases considering
the negotiability of corporate bonds. Enoch v. Brandon, supra note 5;
Muanhattan Co. v. Morgan; Babcock v. National Surety Co., both supra
note 3; Hibbs v. Brown; Interboro Brewing Co. v. Doyle, both supra note
8; Pratt v. Higginson; Dengler v. Paul; King Cattle Co. v. Joseph; Gros-
field v. First National Bank; Mlanker v. American Savings Bank & Trust
Co.; Jones v. American Savings Bank & Trust Co.; Montvale v. Peoples
Bank; Adrian v. Whitney National Bank; Bank of California v. National
City Co., all supra note 9. It is of course probable that courts will avoid
this result, but uncertainty there surely is. Statutes are to be inter-
preted so as to effectuate the purpose of the legislature, and in this Act
itself is the provision: "This article shall not be construed to limit or
impair the negotiability or quasi negotiability (sic) by agreement or other-
wise of any instrument whether or not defined herein." § 262. But since
the legislature has expressly prescribed a condition to an "absolute title,"
a supposition as to intention does not entitle a court to overlook the ex-
plicit terms of a statute. As to the clause quoted, the meaning of "nego-
tiability" is not given; it may be questioned whether it includes the creation
in a purchaser of a title free from claims of ownership. Cf. note 15 supra.
Contrast the more specific and restricted wording of N. I. L. § 52.
22A possible remedy for this result would be a provision in the bond
"whereby any and all holders forego and renounce their equities in favor
of later holders for value without notice" of such equities or claims of
ownership, as suggested though not passed on by Cardozo, C. J., in Man-
hattan Co. v. Morgan, supra note 3, at 50, 150 N. E. at 598. Its effective-
ness, however, may well be doubted. See American National Bank v.
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Section 261(3) omits any requirement of good faith in the
purchaser. In this respect, the Section differs from the common
law and is not in line with other statutes dealing with the ef-
fect of "negotiation" of documents. 23  The whole question is
reduced to one of notice. Whether such a change is an improve-
ment in the law may be doubted. For the affirmative, it may
be argued that it avoids inquiry into a state of mind; but the
answer is that in any case the subjective inquiry is generally to
be determined by consideration of objective acts. On the other
hand, the change emphasizes questions as to what constitutes
notice, actual or constructive, and appears to protect a purchaser
who, though without notice of defenses or equities as specified
in the Act, buys in the utmost bad faith.24
As already indicated, Section 261 (3) provides that one qual-
ifying as a holder of "absolute title" of a corporate bond takes
"free of any defenses enforceable against or claims of ownership
of . . . any prior holder." (Italics ours). Thi& would seem to
abolish any "real defense" of either the maker or the indorser.
As to defenses of the corporation maker against prior holders,
it seems reasonably certain that the Act does not evidence an
intent on the part of the legislature to include in the word "de-
fenses" situations in which the bond is totally void or never
had any valid inception, as in the case of forgery.5 It seems
Sommerville, 191 Cal. 364, 216 Pac. 376 (1923), and Enoch v. Brandon,
supra notes 5 and 7.
23N. I. L. § 52 (N. Y. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUM AENTS LAW § 91): "A holder
in due course is a holder who has* taken the instrument . , . (3) . . . in
good faith...." UNIFORM BILLs Op LADING ACT § 38 (N. Y. PERsoNAL Por-
ERTY LAw § 224): "The validity of the negotiation of a bill is not im-
paired ... if the person to whom the bill was" negotiated .. . gave value
therefor, in good faith .... " The UNIFORM WAREHOUSE RECEIPTs ACT §
47 omitted the requirement but it appears in the amendments thereto
and, since 1924, in N. Y. GENERAL BUSINESS LAW § 131: "The validity
of the negotiation is not impaired . . . if the person to whom the receipt
was negotiated paid value therefor, in good faith. . . ." The UNIFORM
SALES ACT § 38 (N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAWv § 119) omits the re-
quirement also, but by the Sales Act Amendments such requirement will
be added, to read: "The validity of the negotiation of a negotiable docu-
ment of title is not impaired . . . if the person to whom the document
was negotiated . .. paid value therefor in good faith .... " The UNIFORM
STOCK TRANsFER ACT § 7 (N. Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW § 168) pro-
vides: "If the indorsement or delivery of a certificate" is invalid ".... pos-
session . . . may be reclaimed and the transfer . . . rescinded, unless: (1)
... transferred ... for value in good faith...."
Doubt is thus cast on Morris v. Muir, supra note 8, where the defend-
ant, who without inquiry bought stolen bonds from a thief, an immature
and obviously degenerate boy of fifteen, was held liable for the value
thereof to plaintiff from whom the bonds were stolen.
25It was so held before the Act. Maas v. Missouri, Kansas & Texas
Ry., 83 N. Y. 223 (1880). Such a course of reasoning as to "real defenses"
is suggested in BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 433, and set forth in
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
somewhat conjectural, however, whether the "real defense" of
alteration 26 may be similarly dealt with, for, although at com-
mon law alteration voided a negotiable corporate bond,2 under
the Negotiable Instruments Law alteration is generally denomi-
nated an affirmative "defense" 2 and an altered negotiable cor-
porate bond, prior to this amendment, was not void but enforce-
able by a holder in due course according to its original tenor.?
With respect to the contract of an indorser, whose indorsement
not only tr ansfers the ownership of a corporate bond 2, but also
in a sense guarantees payment by the corporation maker,2' there
would seem to be little doubt but that Section 261(3) renders
unavailable "real defenses," such as incapacity,= since the claim
of total invalidity could hardly be advanced.23 Furthermore, in
the case of a forged indorsement, a court decision interpreting
BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 509. This would admit of other
"real defenses" under this Statute, such as statutory voidness or the situa-
tion previously covered by § 15 of the N. I. L. where an incomplete in-
strument was not validly delivered. There are, however, few "real
defenses" ordinarily open to a corporate maker.
2 6 Though this problem may not be a pressing one with respect to the
carefully engraved issues of large corporate makers, it cannot be caid
categorically that it is of no importance to the many small corporations
of the sort which issue a "typewritten debenture." This is only ani ex-
ample of details, formerly minutely provided for by the N. L L., now left
to the vagaries of future litigation.
27- Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mlass. 196 (1877); Aldrich v.
Smith, 37 Mich. 468 (1877).28 Wagler v. Tobin, 104 Kan. 211, 178 Pac. 751 (1919); Commercial
Security Co. v. Donald Drug Co., 112 S. C. 457, 100 S. E. 359 (1919);
First National Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 Pac. 691 (1923).
29 N. I. L. § 124.
30 Despite the placing of this Act in the Personal Property Law, com-
mented on in Note (1926) 12 Cor. L. Q. 97, bonds are not "title instru-
ments" like bills of lading, an indorsement of which is only a requisite
to negotiation and not a guaranty of performance by the issuer.
-1Bonner v. City of New Orleans, Fed. Cas. No. 1031, at 853 (C. C. La.
1875); Connecticut Mlutual Life Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. R., 41
Barb. 9 (N. Y. 1863); Lane v. East Tennessee, Va. & Ga. R. R., 81 Tenn.
547 (1884); N. I. L. § 66; cf. N. I. L. § 65.
32 As 'where the indorser is a lunatic, Wirebach Ex'r v. First National
Bank, 97 Pa. 543 (1881) (not liable to a holder in due courze); Anglo-
Californian Bank v. Ames, 27 Fed. 727 (C. C. Neb. 1886) (disaffirmance
against holder in due course); (Brumley v. Chattanooga Speedway & M.
Co., 138 Tenn. 534, 198 S. W. 775 (1917) (disafflrmance); or an infant,
N. I. L. § 22. It certainly makes it plain that an infant or lunatic cannot
disaffirm the transfer and recover the instrument from subsequent holders
in due course, as was allowed in Mlurray v. Thompson, 136 Tenn. 118, 188
S. W. 578 (1916), and Shipman Banking Co. v. Douglas, 206 Inl. App.
586 (1917). These cases are disapproved in BRANNAx, op. cit. supra note
4, at 180. But cf. BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 17, at § 532.
33 The instrument is valid, and the indorsement and delivery certainly
not void inasmuch as they suffice to transfer the property.
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the words "if indorsed" in Section 261 (2) 34 to mean "if indorsed
by the rightful owner or payee named therein" is evidently es-
sential to make certain that a named owner or payee of a corpo-
rate bond shall be protected from losing his property through
negotiation to a purchaser for value without notice of the forged
indorsement35
Section 261 (1), 36 indicating that without exception a bond
payable to bearer may be negotiated by delivery, leads to con-
fusion as to the effect of a special or restrictive indorsement of
such an instrument,}3 or of an indorsement under Section 332
of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law, allowing the
holder of a negotiable bond to make it non-negotiable8 As
Section 332 was not expressly repealed by the present law, the
34 Providing for transfer of title by delivery by anyone in possession of
an order bond "if endorsed in blank, or . . . to a specified person ....
For the entire subsection see infra note 47.
35 Such an objection seems to be answered by the apparent absurdity of
the result. But a forged indorsement is sufficient to pass title in many
European countries. See Embiricos v. Anglo-Austrian Bank, [1905] 1
K. B. 677; cf. British Bills of Exchange Act, 45 & 46 VIT. c. 61, § 60
(1882).
3 "The title to any . . . corporate bond which by its terms entitles
the bearer to the benefits thereof, may be transferred by the delivery
thereof by any person in possession of the same howsoever such possession
may have been acquired."
3 A special indorsement by a holder cannot be said to be an "inclusion"
in the bond of provisions "limiting the right of transfer" within the
meaning of the last paragraph of § 260 (3) providing: "For the purposes
of this article, the character of any such . . . corporate bond is not
affected by the inclusion therein of other provisions not limiting the right
of transfer and the negotiable quality thereof as in this article provided."
If it is such a limiting provision, and if the negative implication of the
Section be correct-that such provisions will affect the character of a bond
-then the logical result is that such an indorsement forever destroys
"negotiability."
There is no answer to the question of what are and what are not "pro-
visions not limiting the right of transfer and the negotiable quality thereof
as in this article provided." See Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rrv. 884, 885.
Interpretation also awaits § 261(2), infra note 47, which requires that an
order corporate bond, to be negotiable, must provide "in substance that
title thereto is transferable, with the same effect as in the case of a
negotiable instrument." Ibid. 886. Both phrases present unfortunate op-
portunities for litigation.
38 "The owner or holder of any corporate or municipal bond or obligation
(except such as are designated to circulate as money, payable to bearer),
heretofore or hereafter issued in and payable in this state, but not regis-
tered in pursuance of any state law, may make such bond or obligation, or
the interest coupon accompanying the same, non-negotiable, by subscribing
his name to a statement indorsed thereon, that such bond, obligation or
coupon is his property; and thereon the principal sum therein mentioned
is payable only to such owner or holder, or his legal representatives or
assigns, unless such bond, obligation or coupon be transferred by indorse-
ment in blank, or payable to bearer, or to order....
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question arises which of the two will govern if a holder attempts
to act under Section 332 to protect his omership of a bearer
bond. The earlier Statute expressly prohibits further negotia-
tion without action by the owner; the Statute under discussion
allows title to a bearer bond to be transferred "by any person
in possession" thereof. The mere existence of such uncertainty
is unfortunate, entirely apart from the question whether busi-
ness convenience is served by having the promise to pay bearer
or the indorsement control the transfer of the instrument.3 The
same sort of uncertainty arises as to the effect of a special in-
dorsement of a bearer bond. It is to be hoped that Section
261(1) avoids the supposed conflict in the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law between Section 9 (5) -1 and Section 40 1 by mating
special indorsements ineffective to control the future negotiation
of bearer bonds,4 2 but, as the Statute is not explicit, only future
litigation will determine whether that result will follow.Y
The amendment as a whole leaves the contract of the indorser
in serious confusion. The inference is that corporate bonds,
because given specified qualities of negotiability by this Act, are
non-negotiable in all other respects, if not conforming with Sec-
tion 1 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Since no mention
is made of the responsibility of indorsers, that question seems
to be released to the confusion surrounding the responsibility
39 That the indorsement of a special indorsee should be necessary for
further negotiation of instruments originally payable to bearer, see Bran-
nan, Some Necessary Avzendments to the Negotiable Inst rzwents Law
(1913) 26 HARV. L. REV., 493, 500. This conception of business convenience
seems the basis of the proposed amendment to the N. I. L. §§ 9 and 40. A
later survey, however, demonstrated a strong feeling among bankers, bond
houses and lawyers that a requirement of further indorsement of bearer
paper already specially indorsed would encumber payment and transfer
out of all proportion to the doubtful gain of cutting down losses. The
opinion of banks and bond houses was unanimous to this effect in regard
to bonds and coupons in particular. Turner, A Factual Avaly&is of Cer-
tain Proposed A-nendments to the Negotiable Istrmients Law (1929) 38
YAIE L. J. 1047, 1050.40 
"The instrument is payable to bearer .... (5) When the only or
last indorsement is an indorsement in blank."4 1 
"Where an instrument, payable to bearer, is indorsed specially, it may
nevertheless be further negotiated by delivery. . . 21
42 Supra note 39.
43 § 261(3) may be cited to show a contrary intention. It provides that
"any holder of any ... corporate bond ... shall be deemed prima facie to
have title thereto as aforesaid [i. e. absolute title) unless the same has been
endorsed to a specified person other than the holder and has not been en-
dorsed in blank by such specified person. . . ." Thus a person, other
than the special indorsee, in possession of a specially indorsed bearer bond
is not presumed to have title. But the term "holder" 'which is nowhere
defined seems quite broad and is at least used in contradistinction to spe-
cial indorsee, and the application of this provision is quite ambiguous.
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of indorsers on non-negotiable instruments.4' Frequently an-
other interested corporation, a county or community, will
indorse an issue of corporate bonds before delivery as an induce-
ment to purchase.'5 If a corporate bond so indorsed be non-
negotiable, liability of the indorser will, of course, result; but
the conflict in the measure thereof has been termed irreconcil-
able.4" It is true that ordinarily such responsibility on bonds
is clearly spelled out and delimited, but a point of such com-
mercial importance should not be subjected to uncertainty in
law.
Section 261 (3) appears to preclude the payee named in an
order bond from having "absolute title" as provided therein.
It limits its protection to persons "to whom title may be trans-
ferred, as in this section provided. .. ." Section 261(2),41 thus
referred to, allows title to such a bond to be "transferred...
if endorsed . . . and delivery is made. . . ." A "transfer" and
endorsement is required before the holder of an order bond is
protected, and delivery to a payee seems not sufficient. It was
a strained interpretation of the Negotiable Instruments Law
that led some courts to hold that a payee could not be a holder in
due course,4" and the lower New York courts seem to have re-
pudiated that interpretation.9 The new law, however, is far
4 The results in this field vary all the way from holding the transferor
of a non-negotiable instrument, not an accommodation party, to be liable
prima facie as a maker, to holding the indorser to be merely an assignor
of a contract chose in action, liable, if at all, in absence of contrary in-
tent, only on implied warranties. Note (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 102.
45 Higgins v. Hocking Valley R. Co., supra note 8; State v. Long Bell
Lumber Co., 12 S. W. (2d) 64 (Mo. 1928).
46 Comment (1927) 37 YALE L. J. 102, 107.
47 "The title to any . . . corporate bond which, by its terms, entitles a
person named therein to the benefits thereof and which provides, in sub-
stance, that title thereto is transferable with the same effect as in the
case of a negotiable instrument, may be transferred by delivery thereof
by any person in possession of the same, howsoever such possession may
have been acquired if endorsed in blank, or if it is endorsed to a specified
person and the delivery is made to such person."
48 N. I. L. § 52 defines a holder in due course as "a holder who
(4) . . . at the time [the instrument] was negotiated to him . . . had
no notice of any ... defect in the title of the person negotiating it." This
was said to mean that a "negotiation" as defined in § 30 (substantially
similar to § 261(1) (2) in this Act) was a condition precedent to the
status of a holder in due course. The conflicting cases are collected and
discussed in BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 361-372, 119-127 and
analyzed and compared in Aigler, Payees as Holders in Due Course (1927)
36 YAi L. J. 608. See also Comment (1927), 36 YALE L. 3. 1005.
49Brown v. Brown, 91 Misc. 220, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1098 (City Ct. 1915);
Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Restaurant & Hotel Co., 171 App. Div. 176,
157 N. Y. Supp. 959 (1st Dep't 1916); see Miller v. Campbell, 173 App.
Div. 821, 824, 160 N. Y. Supp. 834, 840 (1st Dep't 1916); Empire Trust
Co. v. Manhattan Co., 97 Misc. 694, 698 et seq., 162 N. Y. Supp. 029, 632
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more explicit in requiring "negotiation." It can only be hoped
that the literal wording will not be followed to its logical
conclusion.50
Section 261 (4) ,1 in providing that Section 261 is not applica-
ble to transfers made after the date fixed for performance, is
evidently designed to limit the protection of the Act to transfers
before maturity. It appears capable of being interpreted to
upset the rule, well settled at common law and under the Negoti-
able Instruments Law, that the presence on a bond of unpaid,
overdue interest coupons does not alone prevent the transferee
of the bond from being a holder in due course. " The promise
to pay interest in the coupon is probably to be construed as
one of the signer's obligations on the bond. 3 Transfer of bonds
after the due date of such attached coupons is made only "after
the date fixed therein for the performance by the signer of his
obligations thereunder." If Section 261 5 is then no longer ap-
et seq. (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd without opinion, 180 App. Div. 891, 166 N. Y.
Supp. 1093 (1st Dep't 1917); cf. Carnegie Trust Co. v. First National
Bank, 213 N. Y. 301, 107 N. E. 693 (1915). But cf. Hathaway v. County
of Delaware, 185 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153 (1906); see also Cohen v. Ross-
moore, 225 App. Div. 300, 304, 233 N. Y. Supp. 196, 199 (1st Dep't 1929).
-50 It would be regrettable if, where a debtor buys bonds payable to his
creditor and has them remitted to his creditor as payment of his debt,
the creditor-payee should be subject to a defense of fraud or failure of
consideration which the signer may have against the debtor-remitter. To
avoid this result under the N. I. L. the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws propose the following amendment to the N. I. L. § 52: "A holder
in due course is a payee or other holder... 2" NATIONAL CoxFEBNncE or
COM nSSIONMIS ON UNIFORM: STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK (1929) 237. Cor-
responding changes are suggested for §§ 16 and 30. Ibid. 235, 23G. For
the draftsman's comment on the changes, see ibi& 244.
51 "The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to the transfer
of any . . . corporate bond, when it is shown that such transfer was
made after the date fixed therein for the performance by the signer of
his obligations thereunder or, if no date is fixed, after the e-piration of
a reasonable time after the happening of the contingency upon which
the signer became obligated to perform."52 Buffalo Loan, T. & S. D. Co. v. ledina Gas Light Co., 162 N. Y. 67,
56 N. E. 505 (1900); Cromwell v. Sac County, 96 U. S. 51 (1877); In-
diana & Ill. Cent. By. v. Sprague, 103 U. S. 756 (1880). The reasoning
is plain. Unpaid coupons on bonds do "not necessarily constitute notice
of any invalidity in the bonds." Grand Rapids & Ind. R. R. v. Sanders,
54 How. Prac. 214, 221 (N. Y. 1877).
53By definition a corporate bond includes "any interest coupon apper-
taining to any" corporate bond. § 260(3). Even if the promise in the
coupon is held not to be the signer's "obligations" under the bond within
the meaning of § 261(4), the promise to pay interest on certain dates,
customarily first made in the bond itself, would seem to come within the
Section.
51 Providing in substance for transfer of bearer bonds by delivery, sub-
section (1), supra note 36, of order bonds by indorsement and delivery,
1930]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
plicable,55 the bonds are divested of the important attributes of
negotiability provided for in the article.r Of course this result
may be avoided by construing the signer's "obligations there-
under" to mean only his final and chief obligation to pay the
principal at maturity, but again the matter is left uncertain.
The effect of Section 261(4) also appears vague when its ap-
plication to acceleration provisions is considered, since it might
mean that the happening of an event maturing a bond would
render it overdue and thus make Section 261 inapplicable. Yet
except in the rare case of a perpetual bond bearing no maturity
date, it can probably be said that transfers of bonds made after
acceleration are not made "after the date fixed therein for the
performance by the signer of his obligations thereunder" be-
cause the "date fixed therein" has not passed, and that the pre-
vious "happening of the contingency upon which the signer
became obligated to perform" is inoperative to take the transfer
out of the protection of Section 261 because a specified final date
for performance was fixed in the bond.5 7
Piecemeal legislation as a rule has little to commend itself,
especially on a subject of such commercial importance.r8 Ap-
subsection (2), supra note 47, and for protection of the title of a pur-
chaser for value without notice, subsection (3), supra p. 266.
55 This would seem to be possible, even if the bonds did not have the
unpaid coupons still attached, where the bonds themselves contained prom-
ises to pay the interest on certain dates, as "on the first days of January
and July of every year until maturity," which promises were unfulfilled.
56 Only the saving clause in § 262, supra note 21, operates to protect
the negotiable qualities assured to bonds by § 261 (1) (2). Any other re-
sult, though logical, is absurd. Mere transferability is an attribute of
substantially all contract rights under modern common law. BIGULOW, op.
cit. supra note 17, at § 52.
57 This interpretation would protect the purchaser without notice of the
acceleration, which is presumably commendable, but on the same inter-
pretation even if a transferee had notice that the bond was overdue by
reason of acceleration of maturity he would not for that reason take sub-
ject to defenses or claims of ownership. In this respect, the present law
goes well beyond the amendment to the Negotiable Instruments Law pro-
posed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws for the protection of
innocent purchasers of negotiable instruments matured by acceleration.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMM ISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HAND-
Boox (1929) 237. Although much can be said in approval of the use of
acceleration provisions, it is doubtful whether a purchaser with notice
that a corporate bond has been accelerated is entitled to the protection
this amendment would apparently give him.
58 Note (1926) 26 COL. L. Rnv. 884, 891. Professor Williston, refusing
in his report to the Conference of Commissioners to incorporate in the
amendment to the N. I. L. a provision such as the Hofstadter Act, which
would make security receipts negotiable, wrote: "But there is a variety
of other instruments besides receipts for securities which are by banking
custom negotiable. It would be difficult to enumerate them satisfactorily
even under present practice, and future banking customs may readily on-
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parently general uncertainty has been substituted for the earlier
uncertainty which was primarily confined to the one point of
form. Even granting some necessity for immediate action, it
is felt that better means of insuring the negotiability of corpo-
rate bonds were available. A careful definition of corporate
bonds followed by provisions to the effect that such securities,
so defined, should be negotiable within the meaning, and accord-
ing to the limitations and provisions, of the Negotiable Instru-
ments Law, irrespective of whether such securities comply with
the formal requisites of the Negotiable Instruments Law, would
have been more effective.
APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN PRINCIPAL AND INCO E
OF PROCEEDS DERIVED FROMN THE SALE OF UN-
PRODUCTIVE REALTY HELD IN TRUST
THE conflict between the interest of life tenant and remainder-
man in the administration of a trust estate has long been a
fertile source of litigation., Particularly troublesome has been
the allocation between principal and income of the carrying
charges and proceeds derived from the sale of unproductive
real estate. The recent case of Creed v. Connclly 2 illustrates
the typical problem and one possible solution.
The testator left the residue of his estate in trust, income to be
paid to his wife, remainder on her death or remarriage to other
relatives. Part of this estate consisted of unimproved land
which was carried at a loss for ten years. The difference between
the carrying charges and the rental received was deducted from
the other income of the life tenant. When the land was finally
sold at a price well above the appraised value at the time of the
testator's death, the life tenant asked that she be reimbursed
out of the proceeds of sale for the loss of income which she had
suffered. Finding no evidence in either the will itself or in ex-
traneous facts that the testator intended an immediate conver-
sion, the court held that the life tenant was not entitled to
share in the proceeds of sale.
In thus seeking to establish the intention of the testator, the
court adopted the customary approach. The inquiry may be
determined by the words of the will itself. Particularly con-
clusive is a direction that the unproductive real estate should be
large the list." NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK (1929) 241.1 Cf. LEWIN, TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928) 277-293; UNDERHILL, LAW OF
TRUSTS AND TRuSTErs (Sth ed. 1926) 231-240; 2 PERRY, TRusTs AND Tus-
TEEs (6th ed. 1911) c. 18; Note (1921) 13 A. L. l. 1004.
2172 N. E. 106 (Mlass. 1930).
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immediately 'converted into a productive fund. Even though
'the sale is justifiably delayed, the property is regarded as legally
converted from the time of the testator's death or one year
thereafter.3 The life tenant is therefore reimbursed out of the
proceeds of sale for the loss of income which the actual delay
has caused.4 This fiction applies both to personalty and realty
and is part of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
More usual and less decisive than a direction to sell is a clause
giving the trustees power to sell and reinvest at their own dis-
cretion. Sometimes this is interpreted as granting authority
to postpone only for a convenient time the sale of unproductive
real estate, thus justifying the application of the doctrine of
equitable conversion.6 Such an interpretation seems almost cer-
tain of adoption if the predominance of unproductive realty en-
tirely deprives the life tenant of actual income.7 So also if the
court is convinced by other terms of the will that the life ten-
ant would otherwise receive substantially less than the testator
expected.8 When these considerations are inconclusive, subor-
3 The rights of the life tenant to income during the first year after the
testator's death depend on many factors not material to this discussion.
Cf. LEWIN, op. cit. sutra note 1, at 281; Taylor v. Clark, 1 Hare 161
(1841); Equitable Trust Co. v. Kent, 11 Del. Ch. 334, 101 Atl. 875 (1917).
4 Edwards v. Edwards, 183 Mass. 581, 67 N. E. 658 (1903). The testa-
tor gave all his property to trustees: "To invest and reinvest the same at
their discretion in such securities as the laws of this Commonwealth allow
savings banks to invest their funds in." The court said: "Under language
like that of this will, which gives the trustees all the property, real and
personal, and does not indicate an intention that the time for establish-
ing the fund shall be postponed, and which gives to a life tenant the
annual income, it is well settled law in this Commonwealth that income
is to be compounded from the time of the testator's death." 183 Mass. at
583, 67 N. E. at 659.
5 See Yates v. Yates, 28 Beav. 637, 639 (1860); Jordan v. Jordan, 192
Mass. 337, 345, 78 N. E. 459, 461 (1906) ; UNDERrnLL, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 253; PERRY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 548 n.a.
6 Furniss v. Cruikshank, 230 N. Y. 495, 130 N. E. 625 (1921). The
testator authorized the trustees to sell or lease any lands comprised in
the trust. There was a further clause in the will reading: "I hereby de-
clare that all the powers herein given are intended to be discretionary and
to be exercised or not as the said executors and trustees shall think
proper." This was interpreted as an "imperative power" to sell unproduc-
tive realty with discretion as to the time of sale. But the equitable in-
come granted to the life tenant did not begin until two years after the
testator's death.
7 Cf. Furniss v. Cruikshank, supra note 6; Lawrence v. Littlefield, 215
N. Y. 561, 109 N. E. 611 (1915); Edwards v. Edwards, supro, note 4.
8 Ogden v. Allen, 225 Mass. 595, 114 N. E. 862 (1917)., The testator
directed that his widow should receive $4,000 annually out of the net in-
come of the estate but the estate never realized $4,000 a year. The court
approved an apportionment of proceeds realized before the death of the
widow, but denied it on proceeds realized after her death.
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dinate factors, such as degree of kinship to the testator, may aid
in determining whether life tenant or remainderinan should be
preferredY
When the life tenant can offer no affinnative evidence of the
testator's favor, there is little likelihood that an apportionment
will be decreed. 10 Absence of such evidence is apparently re-
garded as proof that no apportionment was intended, particu-
larly if, as in Creed v. Connelly, not even power of sale has
been conferred. But the number of variable factors from which
the intention of the testator may be implied makes any sweep-
ing generalization dangerous. The frequency of reversals of
the trial court's interpretation also indicates the difficulty of
prediction.U1
Even the classification so far suggested is disturbed when
the inquiry is extended to the allocation of the carrying charges
of unproductive realty. According to the general rule, the re-
current costs of a trust estate must, in the absence of the testa-
tor's direction to the contrary, be charged to oincome.= 2 But
the same facts which imply an intention for the apportionment
of proceeds of sale, may be used to justify a decree that the
carrying charges of unproductive realty be charged to prin-
cipaY- Such relief may be even more beneficial to the life
tenant than an apportionment, since it shifts the burden of
financing the property until a sale is accomplished. Sometimes
the life tenant triumphs in both respects, sharing in the pro-
9 See Furniss v. Cruikshank, supra note 6, at 504, 130 N. E. at 627;
Lawrence v. Littlefield, supra note 7, at 569, 109 N. E. at 613; Creed v.
Connelly, supra note 2, at 108. It is usually argued that the life tenant
is the object of the testator's particular solicitude; this argument is of
course strengthened if the life tenants are children of the testator and
the remaindermen are grandchildren not yet in existence.
10 Yates v. Yates, supra note 5; Jordan v. Jordan, supra note 5 (the
court noted that the income was adequate and the life tenants not de-
pendent upon the testator); Patterson v. Vivion, 63 Misc. 389, 117 N. Y.
Supp. 504 (1909); Parkhurst v. Ginn, 228 Mass. 159, 117 N. E. 202 (1917)
(the actual income was sufficient to pay the maximum provided by the
testator).
"' Cf. Creed v. Connelly, -upra note 2; Furniss v. Cruikshantk, supra
note 6. These reversals seem to be based not so much on errors of law
as qn a difference in the interpretation of the testator's intention.
: 
2 BOGERT, TRUSTS (1921) 375.
13 Matter of Vermilye, 100 Misc. 235, 166 N. Y. Supp. 320 (1917);
Spencer v. Spencer, 219 N. Y. 459, 114 N. E. 849 (1916). In these cases
the carrying charges were so large as to deprive the life tenant of all other
income. Also Patterson v. Old Dominion Co., 149 Va. 597, 140 S. E. 810
(1927) (the trustee was authorized to sell the corpus of the estate if
necessary for the support of the life tenant) ; Matter of Lichtenberg, 114
Misc. 89, 185 N. Y. Supp. 913 (1921) (testator directed that no part of




ceeds though relieved of the costs.14 In other cases the question
of carrying charges has been separately presented and resolved,
without inquiry concerning the testator's intention, in favor of
the life tenant.15 In one case, the court after confidently ex-
pressing its conviction that the testator desired no apportion-
ment, ordered that the costs of the same property be charged
to principal. 6 Thus there seem to be four current solutions to
the problem of unproductive realty. The life tenant seems
likely to receive at least one of the two possible types of relief
described; but he may receive both or neither. Beyond this,
even for a given jurisdiction, it seems foolhardy to venture a
-prediction.
This uncertainty seems to follow naturally upon the attempt
to suit the decision to the intention of the testator. Unfor-
tunately since that intention is seldom expressed, there is little
guarantee that it is often realized. A definite rule would eli-
minate much futile guesswork and provide a more convincing
basis for decision. A testator who did not desire the applica-
tion of the accepted rule would be likely to express his contrary
intentions; his silence could be reasonably regarded as acqui-
escence. As a result his intentions would be less debated and
more often fulfilled. The duty of the trustee would be plain.
And the problem would no longer haunt the courts, wasting in
litigation the substance of the estate, sometimes dragging
through appeals and reversals many years after the death of
the life beneficiary.1 7
These considerations seem to commend recent efforts to pop-
ularize a simple and workable rule. Such a rule seems to be
'embodied in Section 12 of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act' 8 which provides that, in the absence of a contrary direc-
tion in the will, the proceeds of a delayed sale of unproductive
14Furniss v. Cruikshank, supra note 6; Lawrence v. Littlefleld, Atp'a
note 7; Ogden v. Allen, supra note 8.
'5 Poole v. Union Trust Co., 191 Mich. 162, 157 N. W. 430 (1916); In
re Marten's Estate, 16 Misc. 245, 39 N. Y. Supp. 189 (1896); lMatter of
Pitney, 113 App. Div. 845, 99 N. Y. Supp. 588 (1st Dep't 1906) (unproduc-
tive real estate acquired by foreclosure).
" Hites Devisees v. Hites Executors, 93 Ky. 257, 20 S. W, 778 (1892).
17 Cf. Creed v. Connelly, supra note 2; Furniss v. Cruikshank, sq}pra
note 6; Spring v. Hollander, 261 Mass. 373, 158 N. E. 791 (1927) ; Ogden
v. Allen, supra note 8. In all these cases the life tenant was dead when
the final decision was rendered.
i8 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS,
PROGRAM AND COiMITTE REPORTS, UNIFORI PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT,
Third Tentative Draft prepared by Dean Charles E. Clark of Yale Uni-
versity School of Law (1930) 190, 198. Substantially the same rule is
adopted in the tentative drafts of the RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW or PROP-
ERTY (1930) Preliminary Draft No. 33, § 164, and RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF TRusTs (1930) Preliminary Draft No. 20, §§ 221, 222.
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realty should be apportioned as follows: to principal that sum
which, invested during the period of delay at a conservative
rate of simple interest, would have produced the net sale price;
to income the remaining portion of the proceeds of sale.10 The
period of delay is defined as beginning when the sale "first could
have been reasonably made, which is presumed, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, to be one year after the trustee
first received the property, if then unproductive, or one year
after it ceased to produce income, if it later became unproduc-
tive." The Act applies whether the will directs, authorizes or
makes no mention of a sale. Thus it adopts one of the four
current solutions of the problem for all of the situations here
discussed. It is completely in harmony with the cases in which
an apportionment is directed,2 0 and fundamentally in harmony
with decisions which relieve the life tenant of the carrying
charges of unproductive realty; it does not go so far as the
cases which give both types of relief,-1 and is contrary only to
decisions like Creed v. Conelly which afford the life tenant no
relief.
But these last cases seem to have little justification either in
reason or authority. They are, for example, directly opposed
to the rules usually applied to personalty. When the residue of
a trust estate contains a reversionary interest, which yields no
present return but promises a lump sum in the future, it is
the duty of the trustee to convert that sum as soon as possible
into a productive investment.22  In case of a justifiable delay,
the life tenant is reimbursed out of the sum finally realized by
19 Unproductive realty is defined by the Act as land which, for a period
of more than one year, does not produce income amounting to more than
one per centum per annum of its value. The Act also provides that: "If
the tenant has received any income from the property, or has had any
beneficial use thereof, during the period while the sale has been thus de-
layed, his share of the delayed income shall be reduced by the amount of
such income received, or the value of the use had." For a "conservative"
rate of interest the Act suggests 4 or 5 per centum per annum.
20 Besides in the situations already discussed, an apportionment is usually
decreed when the unproductive realty has been acquired by the foreclosure
of a mortgage. In re Atkinson, [1904] 2 Ch. 160; Parker v. Seeley, 5G N. J.
Eq. 110, 38 Atl. 280 (1897); Park's Estate, 173 Pa. 190, 33 Atl. 884 (189G).
21 § 12 of the Act also provides that: "During the period while the sale
is delayed all expenses in connection with the property shall be paid out
of principal, but such of them as would have been chargeable to income
had the property been productive shall be repaid with simple interest at
the legal rate out of the delayed income."
22 "Express trusts for conversion must of course be strictly pursued ac-
cording to the directions.... But besides express trusts of this kind there
is frequently imposed upon trustees a duty to convert, not directed in
terms, but arising out of the nature of the property, and the relation in
which the cestuis que trust stand to each other." LEwiN, op. cit. supra
note 1, at 277.
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conversion for the loss of income which he has suffered.23  Nor
need he show a direction for conversion or other evidence of
the testator's intention in order to prove his right to this equi-
table income.24 Conversely when the residue of the estate con-
sists of annuities, unauthorized securities or speculative busi-
ness investments, all yielding present returns but jeopardizing
or diminishing the interests of the remaindermen, they must
be converted into conservative investments.25  In case of delay
the life tenant is entitled not to actual but only to equitable in-
come, 26 and must refund whatever excess he has received.2
The basic assumption of all these cases seems to be that the
testator intends neither life tenant nor remainderman to profit
at the expense of the other.2
Directly opposed to this- principle is the presumption in-
dulged in Creed v. Connelly that the testator intended the life
tenant to suffer a loss of income in order that the remainder-
man might reap the benefits of a rise in real estate values. It
is believed that this anomaly has been developed and perpetuated
by virtue of a misconception. It is generally agreed that the
life tenant is entitled to the actual income of productive real
23 Westcott v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 410 (1816) (partnership); Fearus v.
Young, 9 Ves. 549 (1805) (life estate); Wilkinson v. Duncan, 23 Beav.
469 (1857) (reversion) ; Greene v. Greene, 19 R. I. 696, 36 Atl. 714 (1901)
(banking investments); Hagan v. Platt, 48 N. J. Eq. 206, 21 At]. 860
(1891) (mortgage foreclosure); Holebone v. Holebone, [1919] 2 Ch. 93
(installment payments).
24 If there is evidence that the testator did not intend an apportionment,
the life tenant must of course produce rebutting evidence or lose his case.
But the initial burden of proof rests upon the representatives of the re-
mainderman because the nature of the property raises a presumption in
favor of an apportionment. Cf. UNDERHILL, op. cit. supra note 1, at art. 48.
25 Howe v. Dartmouth, 7 Ves. 138 (1802) (unauthorized, 5% securities);
Morgan v. Morgan, 14 Beav. 72 (1851). Similar cases are collected and
discussed in 2 WHITE & TUDOR, LEDING CASES IN EQUITY (1928) 69 (notes
to Howe v. Dartmouth, supra); Mills v. Mills, 7 Sim. 501 (1835) (lease-
holds, stocks and annuities); LEWIN, op. cit. sUvra note 1, at 278.
26 In Howe v. Dartmouth, supra note 25, the method of computing equi-
table income is to calculate the value of authorized securities which could
have been obtained by conversion one year after the testator's death, glv-
ing the life tenant the income which these securities would then have
earned until the actual conversion.
27 Although the estate has suffered no loss by the delay in conversion,
and has apparently profited by it, the life tenant must refund any excess
income he has received. Dimes v. Scott, 4 Russ. 195 (1828).
28 The rational bases of these cases is well expressed in Wilkinson v.
Duncan, supra note 23, at 472: "The trustees delayed to sell the reversion
until it had fallen into possession because they were of the opinion that,
by so doing, they would in the end produce a larger amount to the estate
of the testator. They acted properly in so doing, but they ought not thereby
to injure one of the legatees of that trust fund for the benefit of others,
and it is to be presumed that they in no way intended to do so."
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estate.2 9 From this it seems to have been inferred that if the
actual income is nothing the life tenant gets nothing; that it
would be inconsistent to allow actual income on productive realty
and equitable income on unproductive realty.3° This argument
is fallacious because the productivity of real estate does not di-
minish or endanger the interests of the remainderman, whereas
its unproductivity does diminish the interest of the life tenant.
Unproductive realty is an improper trust investment not be-
cause of its realty, but because of its unproductivity.3' Conse-
quently there is no inconsistency in giving even the same life
tenant the actual income of productive real estate and the equi-
table income, i.e., a share in the proceeds of sale, of unproductive
real estate.3 2
Not only does the rule of Creed v. Conmwlly seem mistaken in
theory, but it also leads to unfortunate practical consequences.
The trustee is often placed in a position where he cannot pos-
sibly fulfill his duty to act impartially between life tenant and
remainderman. Either he must subject the life tenant to the
loss of income consequent upon delay, or he must sell hurriedly
at the low figures which usually attend hasty liquidation, thus
sacrificing the interests of the remainderman. The life tenant
will often press for the latter course and may obtain a court
order directing it. 33 Thus an unnecessary conflict of interest
- In re Searle, [1900] 2 Ch. 829; Hope v. d'Hedouville [1893] 2 Ch.
361; In re Earl of Darnley, [1907] 1 Ch. 159. These last two cases depart
from the rule applied to personalty. Although a conversion was directed in
the will, the court allowed the life tenant the actual income during the
period of delay.
30 The argument is articulated in Martin v. Kimball, 86 N. J. Eq. 10, 15,
96 Ati. 565, 567 (1916). The land devised was partly productive and
partly unproductive. The will directed the trustees to convert the land
into cash but also provided that the life tenant should have the rents ac-
tually produced. The unimproved real estate was carried for a time by
the trustees and then sold as building lots. The court refused an appor-
tiomnent of the proceeds, saying: "If the testatrix intended her husband
to enjoy the rents that negatives the idea that she intends him to enjoy
notional [equitable] income. If she gave him rents she cannot be deemed
to contemplate a condition of the property in which there will be no rents.
No court has held that he can have both."
3 1 Bogert suggests that it is inadvisable for a trustee to invest in real
estate, productive or unproductive. But in the absence of a clause in the
will directing a sale, there is no duty to sell productive real estate, as there
is for example to sell annuities and unauthorized securities. Cf. BoG=ftT,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 359.
S2 In a recent surrogate'si case in New York the life tenant seems to
have been given the actual income of productive realty and a share in the
proceeds of unproductive realty. The facts are unfortunately not clearly
reported. Matter of Hopkins, 133 Mlisc. 554, 233 N. Y. Supp. 32G (1929).
- In Spring v. Hollander, supra note 17, the court refused an apportion-
ment on the ground that under the existing state statute, I. L. C. 127 §
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prevents a peaceful and economical management of the trust.
It is by insuring the life tenant of a share in the profits of
delay that the rule of the Uniform Act would eliminate this
conflict and encourage far-sighted and harmonious trust ad-
ministration.
THE AFFECTING OF FARMERS' COOVERATIVES WITH
THE PUBLIC INTEREST
THE legal status of cooperative associations has once more been
brought to the fore in a series of interesting cases. These cases
all center about Oklahoma statutes dealing with cooperative or-
ganization in a particular industry-cotton ginning. The funda-
mental principles underlying all forms of cooperative enterprise
are so similar, however, that the decisions of the courts in this
limited sphere may fairly be taken as representative of the judi-
cial attitude towards the movement in general.1
A detailed study of the background in which these cases are
set is necessary at the outset in order properly to gauge their
significance as a part of the growing body of law dealing with
cooperative enterprise. The part which cotton ginning plays
in the processing of cotton made it peculiarly adaptable to the
development of cooperative ventures. Cotton gins perform a
service indispensable to the preparation of raw cotton for mar-
keting. Until recent years they have been operated by individual
ginners who were independent of the grower and unmindful of
his economic welfare. Since a grower often had access to but
one gin, there was frequently neither an effective check .upon
the charge made for ginning nor any assurance of efficiency.
The result was an exploitation of the grower which cut deep
into his profits.2 The evils attendant upon this state of monopo-
listic competition led Oklahoma to pass a law making gins "pub-
lic utilities," 3 and empowering the state Corporation Commis-
28-31, the life tenant could have initiated an earlier sale. This argument
only accentuates the undesirability of such decisions.
1 For detailed accounts of the history and development of the coopera-
tive movement in this country see NoURsE, THE LEGAL STATUS OF AGRICUL-
TURAL COOPERATION, (1927) and STEEN, COOPERATIvE MARKETING (1923);
for a study of its status abroad see FAY, COOPERATION AT HOME AND
ABROAD (1925).
2A vivid picture of the cotton grower's need of some form of organiza-
tion to increase his bargaining power and thereby enable him to solve
more satisfactorily his economic problems appears in MONTGOMERY, Ti
COoPERATIVE PATTERN IN COTTON (1929).
3 The statute declared gins to be "public utilities," and their operation
for the purpose of ginning seed cotton "a public business." OKLA. COMP.
STAT. (1921) § 3712.
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sion to establish rates and regulations for their operation.4 Sub-
sequently, when the spread of the doctrine of cooperative organ-
ization taught growers to form associations to gin their own
cotton, other statutes were passed granting special privileges
to these organizations.5 The power to regulate the industry
having been assumed, these later statutes followed as a matter
of course.6
From 1917 to 1928 cooperative ginning associations flourished
under the protection thus afforded them by the Legislature.' In
1928, however, the Supreme Court of the United States in Frost
v. Corporation Commiss-on of Okalonma5 held unconstitutional
a statute passed in 1925 which permitted cooperative ginning
associations to procure licenses to operate from the Commission
on terms more favorable than those allowed commercial gin-
ners.9 The statute had conferred this privilege on all cooper-
4 OKrLA. ComP. STAT. (1921) § 3712; § 3713 (as amended by 0kla. Laws
1923, c. 191, p. 340); § 3714 (as amended by Okla. Laws 1925, § 1, c. 109,
p. 157); § 3715 (as amended by Okla. Laws 1923, c. 191, § 3); §§ 3716-18.
OKLA. CouP. STAT. (1921) § 5599, passed in 1917, authorized the for-
mation of cooperative associations without capital stock and not conducted
for profit. In 1919 this was enlarged, OKLA. COUP. STAT. (1921) §§ 5037-
5652, to permit the formation of cooperatives with capital stock. The
statutes conferring upon the cooperatives special privileges, in particular
the right to receive a license on the presentation of a petition signed by
100 citizens and taxpayers, and the right to declare "patronage dividends,"
will be discussed in detail in the body of this comment.
6Aside from public utilities and common callings, only those businesses
which are held to be affected with the public interest are subject to such
drastic public interference as price regulation. Alunn v. Illinois, 94 U. S.
113 (1876). Accordingly, the device used by legislatures to prepare the
way for the regulation of an industry has been to declare it affected with
a public interest. If the affectation is held valid, then regulation will be
permitted. For a history of the cases bearing on this subject see Hamil-
ton, Affectatian with Public Interest (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 1089; McAllister,
Lard Hale and Business Affected suith a Public Intcrest (1930) 43 HAM.
L. R.v. 759. The Oklahoma Legislature was thus but following a time-
honored formula.
7The following cases assumed the validity of the statutes making gin-
ning a public business, and upheld the Commission's regulatory powers:
Sims v. State, 80 Okla. 254, 196 Pac. 132 (1921) ; Planters' Cotton & Gin-
ning Co. v. West Bros., 82 0kla. 145, 198 Pac. 855 (1921). Choctaw Cotton
Oil Co. v. Corporation Commission of Okla., 121 Okla. 51, 247 Pac. 39D
(1926) held constitutional the specific statute discussed in the Frost case,
infra note 8.
8 278 U. S. 515, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 (1929).
9 OKrA. Comn. STAT. (1921) § 3713 (as amended by Okla. Laws 1923, c.
191, p. 340) had provided that no person or corporation should be permitted
to operate a gin without first having secured a license from the State Cor-
poration Commission. The Act of 1925, which was held unconstitutional,
declared: "No new gin plants shall be constructed, installed or licensed,
or any old gin removed from one point to another until satisfactory show-
ing shall have been made to the Corporation Commission setting forth
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atives, whether of the stock or nonstock type.1  Between a
stock cooperative and an ordinary commercial corporation, Mr.
Justice Sutherland held, there was no distinction sufficient to
warrant separate classification. Accordingly, the plaintiff had
been denied the equal protection of the law because the defend-
ant, a cooperative of the "stock" type, had not been required to
show a public need for his gin before a license was granted
him." The decision of the Court did not question the propriety
of treating cooperative associations and ordinary business enter-
prises as two distinct types of organization for regulative pur-
poses. The Court's objection went to the form of the cooper-
ative rather than to the end it seeks to attain, for nonstock
associations were considered susceptible of separate classifica-
tion.12
Reorganization of all cooperative associations on a nonstock
basis was the obvious method of avoiding the limitation im-
posed by the decision. But since by far the greater majority of
cooperatives in Oklahoma were, and still are, of the stock type,
that such gin is a needed utility, and that the proposed corporation, com-
pany, firm or individual is a competent and desirable corporation, company,
firm or individual to establish and operate said gin as may appear in the
discretion of said Commission; provided, that on the presentation of a
petition for the establishment of a gin to be run co-operatively, signed by
one hundred (100) citizens and taxpayers of the community where the
gin is to be located, the Corporation Commission shall issue a license for
said gin." OxLA. CoAn'. STAT. (1921) § 3714 (as amended by Okla. Laws
1925, c. 109, § 1).
10 The defendant cooperative was organized under the 1919 act, supra
note 4.
11 A discussion of the decision is not in order here. The dissents of Mr.
Justice Brandeis and of Mr. Justice Stone, in both of which Mr. Justice
Holmes concurred, set forth the contrary view of the problem. For an
exhaustive critique of the case see Hamilton, Judicial Toleranco of Farm-
er' Cooperatives (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 936.
12 This division of cooperatives into two groups finds no support in the
past history of the cooperative movement. The "rules" set out by the
Grange Convention of 1875, the first guide to the formation of cooperatives
in this country, provided for the organization of these units on a stock
basis. NOURSE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 35-6. Today, at least thirty-three
states provide for the formation of such organizations. See the dissent of
Mr. Justice Brandeis in the Frost case, supra note 8, at 540, 48 Sup. Ct. at
244. Congress has twice recognized the special purpose of these stock co-
operatives, as well as their dissimilarity from ordinary business corpo-
rations. Revenue Act of 1926, 44 STAT. 39 (1926), 26 U. S. C. § 982 (1926)
(exempting stock cooperatives from corporate income taxes); Cappor-Vol-
stead Act of 1922, 4 STAT. 388 (1922), 7 U. S. C. § 291 (1926) (removing
contracts made by stock cooperatives with members and non-members from
the category of contracts in restraint of trade). Not till the decision of
Mr. Justice Sutherland was it suggested that these organizations were in-
distinguishable from commercial corporations. His logic seems unreal and
legalistic rather than practical.
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it was deemed expedient to experiment further with legislation
before discarding the existing form of cooperative organization."
A statute was therefore passed in 1929 divesting of the "public
interest" those gins which accepted business solely from those
maintaining and operating the gin.- Gins were thereby divided
into two groups: the cooperative gins, now operating as private
enterprises, and the commercial gins, operating as public busi-
nesses. In this strange blending of competition and monopoly
was sought freedom for the cooperative.
The experiment was short-lived. The statute was declared
unconstitutional in Chick'asw Cotton Oil Co. v. Cotton County
Gin Co.,'5 a decision which is also important because it sus-
tained the previously assumed power of the Oklahoma legisla-
ture to affect ginning with the public interest.' 6 In the Chickasw.s
case, the plaintiff, a duly licensed ginner, sought to enjoin the
defendant from setting up a gin under the 1929 Act. The de-
fendant had brought himself within the letter of this Act by
subscribing for 24,850 shares of his own capital stock, of a nom-
inal value of one dollar a share, and selling the remaining 150
shares to his prospective customers, the cotton growers in his
vicinity. By the terms of the Act the defendant then incorpo-
13 At the time of the decision in the Frost case, 82% of the cooperatives
in Oklahoma were of the stock type. See the dissent of Mr. Justice Bran-
deis, 278 U. S. at 548, 49 Sup. Ct. at 247, for detailed statistics of the
set-up in the state at that time.
At least one writer maintains the position that the ends attained through
the stock cooperative may be attained through the nonstock type. See Ham-
ilton, op. cit. supra note 11, at.953. Mr. Justice Brandeis, however, sug-
gests that the history of the movement demonstrated the need for organ-
izations of the stock type. 278 U. S. at 547, 49 Sup. Ct. at 246. Mr. Jus-
tice Brandeis' reasoning is not altogether convincing. It seems plausible
that ingenious manipulation and modification of the nonstock form of or-
ganization might well have produced the results attained by the use of the
stock type. It is true at least that the adoption of this latter type vas the
simpler and more obvious procedure.
SOkla. Laws 1929, c. 240, amending OLA. CortP. STAT. (1921) § 3712
to read as follows: "That cotton gins maintained and operated for the pur-
pose of ginning seed cotton of the general public, or of persons other than
the person or persons, or the stockholders of the corporation maintaining
and operating said gin, or maintained and operated for the purpose of
ginning seed cotton not produced and owned by the person or persons, or
the stockholders of the corporation, maintaining and operating said gin,
are hereby declared to be public utilities, and the operation of same for
the purpose of ginning seed cotton is declared to be a public business."
15 40 F. (2d) 846 (C. C. A. 10th, 1930). An earlier case attacking the
constitutionality of this statute, Owens v. Corporation Commission of Ok-
lahoma, 41 F. (2d) 799 (W. D. Okla. 1930), was dismissed on the ground
that the plaintiff was not in a position to challenge the statute.
16 The court in the Owens case, supra note 15, remarked: 'For the gen-
eral public good, the question ought to be settled one way or another,
which can only be done by the Supreme Court of the United States." 41
F. (2d) at 803.
1930]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
rated, not as a regulated public utility, but as an independent un-
licensed ginner. Pointing to the abuse of the statute, the plain-
tiff claimed that the Act violated the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The defend-
ant contended in his answer that as the earlier law declaring
gins, public utilities was unconstitutional he needed no license
to operate; but that if it were constitutional, the 1929 Act, ex-
cusing ginners of his type from the requirement of obtaining
a license, was also constitutional. The District Court decided
in favor of both of the defendant's contentions, and dismissed
the bill. The Circuit Court reversed this decision on both counts.
The conditions existing in the ginning industry, the long ac-
quiescence in the validity of the early law by ginners and grow-
ers alike, and the assumption of the validity of the law by the
Supreme Court in the Frost case led this tribunal to declare the
affectation valid.17 The 1929 Act, however, open as it was to
abuse, and open also to the objection made in the F rost case to
the 1925 statute, namely, that it failed to distinguish between
true cooperative associations and stock corporations, the Circuit
Court held invalid as discriminatory. The Court indicated that,
had the Statute applied solely to genuine cooperatives as defined
by the Frost case, there would have been no discrimination.',
This judicial erasure of the 1929 Act reestablished the F 4ost
case as the basis upon which the cooperatives must build.1'
17 Each of the three judges sitting on the case wrote a separate opinion.
Two of them discussed gravely whether or not the cotton ginning industry
falls within the three classes of public utilities set out by Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630 (1923). Both decided in the affirmative. The third
judge, showing more of a consciousness that the court was dealing with
an economic rather than a legal problem, stressed the conditions prevailing
in the industry before the passage of the 1915 statute,
is "I thought then, and think now, that the Legislature has power to
classify genuine co-operative associations or corporations; one who gins
his own cotton, or a group of growers who incorporate for the purpose
of ginning their cotton, may be fairly and differently classified from those
who gin cotton primarily for profit. But the 1929 amendment is not so
drawn as to confine the exemption to cooperative enterprises. There are
no real limitations in it. The defendant is not a co-operative concern at
all; it is a commercial enterprise; on its present plan, when working to
capacity, $24,850 of its $25,000 capital will be owned by a commercial
ginner, who grows cotton as a side line, or to enable him to gain exemp-
tion from the regulation to which other commercial ginners are subject, It
is 6/10 of 1 per cent. co-operative, and that is not enough. Because it is
not in fact and truth a co-operative concern, and because the amendment
permits of such a subterfuge, and for that reason alone, I agree the amend-
ment cannot stand." McDermott, J., 40 F. (2d) at 852.
19 The possibility that the Chickasha case may be reversed by the Su-
preme Court must not be overlooked. There seems little chance, however,
that this possibility will be actualized. The nature of the ginning industry
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However, a few weeks after the Chickash case was decided, the
Supreme Court handed down the decision of Corporation Com-
mission of Oklacwduna v. Lowe 2 which raises grave doubts as
to the effect of the Frost case. Though decided after Chiekasha
v. Cotton County Gin Co., the Lowe case began its course through
the courts before the passage of the Act held unconstitutional
in the Chicka-slwh decision. This latter decision and the 1929 Act
are therefore no part of its setting. The fact patterns of the
Lowe and the Frost cases are much alike. In each the plaintiff,
a licensed ginner, sued to enjoin the licensing of a cooperative
gin. But the plaintiff in the Lowe case claimed that the statute
permitting cooperatives to distribute earnings to customers as
"patronage dividends" based on the business brought to the gin
by the customer 21 discriminated against non-cooperative ginners
who were required to conform to the rate schedule set by the
Commission and were denied the right to give rebates. The
injunction was granted by a three judge court. In reversing
this decision, M r. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unani-
mous court, declared that the plaintiff had failed to show any
law of Oklahoma or ruling of the Commission forbidding the
plaintiff to distribute his own earnings to his customers, and
therefore that any claim of discrimination was unfounded.
The Lowe case is of more interest for what it does not say
than for what it does. The court hurdled completely at least one
issue which might have proved embarrassing. This was whether
the cooperative had made a satisfactory showing of public neces-
makes a strong case for upholding the affectation statute. The freshness of
the Frost case in the mind of the Court makes it unlikely that the 1929
Act would be held constitutional. Of course the Court might very well
hold the statute itself constitutional as a valid classification, and find that
this particular plaintiff was not within the classification there set out.
20281 U. S. 431, 50 Sup. Ct. 397 (1930).
21 OKLA. C0wnP. STAT. (1921) § 5648. The pertinent parts of the statute
read as follows: "The directors, subject to revision by the stockholders, at
any general or special meeting lawfully called, shall apportion the net
earnings and profits thereof from time to time at least once in each year
in the following manner:
(1) Not less than ten per cent thereof accruing since the last apportioi-
ment shall be set aside in a surplus or reserve fund until such fund shall
equal at least fifty per cent of the paid-up capital stock.
(2) Dividends at a rate not to exceed eight per cent per annum, may,
in the discretion of the directors, be declared upon the paid-up capital
stock. Five per cent may be set aside for educational purposes.
(3) The remainder of such net earnings and profits shall be apportioned
and paid to its members ratably upon the amounts of products Eold to
the corporation by its members, and the amounts of the purchases of mem-
bers from the corporation provided, that if the by-laws of the corporation
shall so provide, the directors may apportion such earnings and profits
in part to non-members upon the amounts of their purchases and sales
from or to the corporation."
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sity when it applied for its license. Nothing stood out more
clearly from the Frost case than that this was a universal stand-
ard to be met by every ginner seeking to set up a gin.22 Since
there is no mention, either in the briefs or in the opinion of the
Lowe case, of compliance or non-compliance with this require-
ment by the cooperative, it would be supposed that the Commis-
sion had made an exhaustive inquiry into the circumstances sur-
rounding the defendant's application for a license. Yet the record,
far from showing that this requirement had been met, rather
discloses that the plaintiff was given no opportunity to argue
before the Commission his claim that there was no public need
for his competitor's gin; nor does the record disclose what show-
ing of public need was in fact made by the defendant .2 1 Whether
the procedure before the Commission justified the assumption
that a sufficient showing of necessity had been made, seems at
least debatable. The failure of counsel to raise the questions of
adjective law involved is inexplicable. Certainly this neglect
afforded the Supreme Court an opportunity to overlook, con-
sciously or unconsciously, an issue common to both the Frost
and the Lowe cases. The raising of this issue of public necessity
might well have resulted in a contrary decision of the latter case.
Thus while the result reached in the case is to be applauded, its
silence leaves unsettled an important question. It is still the
law of Oklahoma that a showing of public necessity is a condi-
tion precedent to the securing of a ginning license. Thus far
none of the cases has indicated of what such a showing must
consist. The Court in the Lowe case left undisturbed the finding
of the Commission on that point. It is true that the issue was
raised only indirectly, but if the case may nevertheless be inter-
preted as representing the view that the issuing of licenses is
to be at the discretion of the Commission, the problem becomes
22 The Frost case literally did no more than hold invalid a particular
statute providing for obtaining licenses by another means than that of
showing public necessity. Its implications nevertheless would seem broad
enough to cover other cases where the resulting discrimination would be
the same as under the statute of the Frost case, whether this discrimination
resulted from procedural or other faults of the Commission.
123 On March 8, 1929, the cooperative filed with the Corporation Commis-
sion an application for a license to gin. A hearing on the application was
set for March 18 and held on that date, the Commission taking the appli-
cation under advisement. Lowe, who owned two gins which would be in
competition with the new gin, first heard of the application and the hear-
ing after the latter had been held. He at once filed an application to re-
open the case, claiming that there was no need for the defendant's pro-
posed gin. On April 8 the Commission rejected this application for a
vehcaring. Record on Appeal, pp. 6-7. On the following (lay the plaintiff
-filed with the District Court his bill for an injunction. The record un-




administrative rather than judicial. Free from fear of reversal
by the courts, the Commission may then face with frankness
economic considerations; 2  legal doctrines will no longer be the
medium in which the final decision is rendered. Such a proce-
dure affords an enviable short-cut to the realization of a social
program by eliminating the possibility that the shift in terms
from economic policy to legal doctrine will result in the disposal
of a case on irrelevant legalistic issues.
The Court's treatment of what it apparently conceived to be
the sole issue in the case is not so happy. It should first be
noted that cotton ginning is by statute a public business subject
to the control of the Commission. One of the chief incidents to
the regulation of a public business is the maintenance of a uni-
form rate schedule. This requires not only that charges for serv-
ice be no more than those set, but also that they be uniform, lest
discrimination ensue.2 5 Past experience has shown that the giv-
ing of rebates is a ready means of enabling a utility or a carrier
to deviate from a rate schedule.2r The instant decision frankly
legitimizes this practice, for, however dignified their title,
"patronage dividends" smack of rebates. With no check on the
uniformity of service charges it will be an ingenious Commis-
sion indeed that can devise effective means of controlling the
industry.7
Furthermore, in considering the effect of the holding in the
Lowe case upon the cotton ginning industl, attention is at once
24 It may be argued that the intention of the Court would in no case be
to deprive the courts of all power of review. To do so would probably be
unconstitutional as a violation of the due process clause. See Ohio Valley
Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920).
The scope of this limited review is a matter of speculation. An analogous
situation has arisen from the passage of statutes in some states maling
a showing of "public convenience and necessity" a condition precedent to
receiving a license permitting the operation of motor busses. For a dis-
cussion of the problems arising in connection with these statutes see
Lilienthal and Rosenbaum, MAotor Carrier Regulation by Ccrtificates of
Necessity and Convenience (1926) 36 YALE L. 3. 163 (particularly, in
regard to judicial review, at 190-192).
2 5 See Messenger v. Pennsylvania Ry., 37 N. J. L. 531 (1874) ; Pennsyl-
vania Ry. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184, 33 Sup. Ct. 893
(1913); Wight v. United States, 167 U. S. 512, 17 Sup. Ct. 822 (1897).
See also NICHOLS, PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE AND DIsCRIAIINATION (1928) 880-
881, and cases there cited.
26 Supra note 25. Here again the brief for Lowe seems inadequate. It
includes no presentation of the economic situation, nor of past e\perience
in the giving of rebates in other fields of governmental regulation.
27 State regulation does not always bring with it the consequences de-
sired. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 42 F. (2d) 913 (W. D. 0kla. 1930),
is an interesting illustration of how the affectation of the ice industry with
the public interest resulted in more evil than good. A competitive industry
became a monopoly in the hands of a few large entrepreneurs. The court
in consequence held the statute unconstitutional.
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attracted by the differences in the two types of organization en-
gaged therein. On the one hand is the commercial enterprise
operating for private gain; on the other, the cooperative seek-
ing to provide service at cost. The statutes of Oklahoma clearly
contemplate that the ginning industry is to be open to all comers,
whether individual, corporate or cooperative. But since cooper-
atives may distribute patronage dividends, a-ad are allowed by
statute to gin for non-members, commercial ginners must either
declare sucl dividends or see their customers disappear. The
inevitable result will be the gradual elimination of private en-
terprise from the ginning industry. The court in the Lowe case
gives no indication that it is aware of this problem when it jus.
tifies the right of the cooperative to distribute patronage divi-
dends by the right of the individual to do likewise. The decision
gives cooperatives extraordinary advantages over commercial
gins. In view of the growth of cooperatives as a means of in-
suring the farmer a fair share of the ultimate selling price of
his product, such a result may well be approved. But the result
has been attained in such a manner as to open the decision to
serious attack. Acquisitive and non-acquisitive enterprises are
to compete on the same level, and "public utility" rates are to
be set by this unequal competition. The artificiality of such a
scheme is only too apparent.
To estimate the effect of the Lowe case upon the cooperative
movement is a difficult task. The categories set up by Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland have unfortunately not been directly repudiated.
It is apparent that the give and take of judicial phrase-fighting
must continue for some time to come before the exact forms that
cooperatives may take and the powers that they may exercise
will finally be defined. Even, here the Lowe case makes little
progress. 28 The case may, it is true, be considered indicative
of a more benevolent attitude on the part of the Supreme Court
toward cooperatives. But courts in general have accorded co-
operatives judicial recognition for many years.29 Insofar as it
indicates a willingness to leave such problems to administrative
bodies, such as the State Corporation Commissions, the decision
is to be applauded. Such a solution will remove issues irrele-
vant to the real problem at stake. But the chapter of legisla-
tive and judicial history outlined above is particularly interesting
for the paradox it presents. When a statute regulating an in-
28 See infra note 29. See also the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in the
Frost case, 278 U. S. at 540, 49 Sup. Ct. at 244. The Frost and the Lowe
cases are but the first of a series in which these questions will be discussed.
29 The early cases establishing judicial recognition are listed and dis-
cussed in Nonuss, op. cit. supra note 1, at 399-402; Sapiro, The Law of
Cooperative Marketing Associations (1926) 15 Ky. L. J. 1; Tobriner, The




dustiy reacts to the disadvantage of those for whose benefit it
was passed, when the restrictions placed on formerly independ-
ent actors become privileges, then the law contains anomalies
indeed.
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON STATE FREEDOM
OF ACTION IN CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
THE recent case of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick I has again
demonstrated how state freedom of action in conflict of laws
situations is circumscribed by the Federal Constitution. The
courts of an independent nation, when deciding a conflict of laws
case, may be said either to enforce rights vested in a foreign
territory, if such enforcemdnt is not contrary to the public policy
of the forum, 2 or, by another view, to create rights in the forum
when in the light of its own established policy it feels free to do
so.3 Both of these theories, devised to describe judicial action in
conflict of laws situations, indicate that in the last analysis the
local public policy of the forum will determine whether, on the
one hand, foreign rights will be enforced or, on the other, local
rights created. The individual state courts of a federated nation,
however, find that their own local policies must frequently give
way to broader national interests.4 The full faith and credit, the
due process, the contract and the commerce clauses of the United
States Constitution all confer upon the Supreme Court a general
power of compelling a recognition of national interests. And
moi'e particularly, the Supreme Court, through these clauses,
would seem to possess the power of compelling such a recognition
of national interests by imposing its own conflict of laws views
on the states so as to bring uniformity into the confused field of
interstate law.5 Although it is impossible to define the exact
150 Sup. Ct. 338 (1930).
2 This is the "vested rights" or "territorial" theory. Beale, Summary of
the Conflict of Laws, 3 CASES ON THE CoNcFLicT o LNws (1902) §§ 1-5,
41, 47. Rights once vested under the law of one territory "continue until
destroyed or cut off by law . . . and are recognized and enforced in one
state though they have come into being in another, unless such enforcement
is, for good reason, thought contrary to the public policy of the jurisdiction
where enforcement is sought." GOODRICH, HIANDB00K ON THE ComNCr op
LAws (1927) 10. For discussion see Beach, Uniform Intcrstate Enforce-
inent of Vested Rights (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 656; Lorenzen, Ternitoiality,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. T. 736; Yntema,
The Hornbook: Methed and the Conflict of Laws (1928) 37 Y,= L. J. 468.
3 This is the "local law" theory. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of
the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 457.
4 DoDD, STATE GOVERNMENT (2d ed. 1928) 34.
5 See Dodd, The Power of the Stpremne Court to Reiew, State Decison
in the Field of the Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HAnv. L. REv. 533.
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scope of this power and difficult to predict just how far the
Supreme Court will go in exercising it, some idea can be given
of its possible extent and of the present policy of the Supreme
Court with regard to its use.
The general scope of this power can probably best be ascer-
tained by an examination of the interpretation given the full
faith and credit clause.6 It is now well settled by Congressional
enactment 7 and Supreme Court decision , that the judgments
6 From the point of view of securing Supreme Court review, either by
appeal as of right or review at the discretion of the Court by writ of
certiora'ri, it makes little difference whether the full faith and credit or
some other clause is invoked. Appeal as of right can now be had "whore
is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States, and the decision is against its validity; or where is drawn in
question the validity of a statute of any State, on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States and
the decision is in favor of its validity." In other situations review can be
had only at the discretion of the Supreme Court by bringing a writ of
certiorari. 43 STAT. 93T (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1926). In the case
where a state court applies a local statute to a foreign transaction over the
objection that the statute, so applied, is unconstitutional, the due process
clause would in all probability be the one inv6ked. But an appeal as of
right could also be secured by invoking the full faith and credit clause,
since by applying the local statute the forum would be rejecting the appli-
cation of some foreign law, whether a statutory or decisional doctrine, or a
judgment. Cf. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389, 45 Sup. Ct.
129 (1924); Western Union v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 34 Sup. Ct. 955 (1914)
(where interstate commerce clause invoked); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337 (1918) (where contract clause in-
volved). Under the old rules of Supreme Court review counsel were perhaps
more cautious as to which clause they invoked, because by improvidently
claiming an appeal as of right under one clause, they would be precluded
from seeking review in the alternative on writ of certiorari under another
clause, the two forms of review being mutually exclusive. This hazard has
now, however, been removed. 43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1926).
In any case now the Court will at least consider the appeal and if a federal
question is involved will review the case on its merits without quibbling
over the terminology of any one particular clause.
7 1 STAT. 122 (1790), 2 STAT. 299 (1804). The first act provided for the
authentication of foreign statutes, records and judicial proceedings and con-
cluded by saying "the said records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have
such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States,
as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence such
records are or shall be taken." This was supplemented by the Act of 1804
providing for the authentication of "all records and exemplifications of office
books . . . not appertaining to a court" and concluded with the same man-
date as to full faith and credit. The second section of this Act extended the
first section and the Act of 1790 to cover territories. In the revision of
1874 these two acts became §§ 905 and 906, now 28 U. S. C. §§ 687 and 688
(1926).
sArmstrong v. Carson, 2 Dallas 302 (U. S. 1794); Mills v. Duryee, 7
Cranch 481 (U. S. 1813); Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234 (U. S.
1818). The same rule applies to Federal Court judgments and pro-
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and judicial proceedings of one state must be accorded the same
full faith and credit by the courts of a sister state as they would
receive in the state of origin. But the Supreme Court has never
expressly decided whether the full faith and credit clause also
requires that one state accord a similar recognition to the statutes
and decisional doctrine of a sister state. There appears to be a
definite possibility that the clause does extend thus farY Cer-
tainly there is no decision holding that statutes need not be given
full faith and credit.", And although Congress has legislated
only on the effect to be accorded judgments and judicial proceed-
ings without making mention of "public acts," '1 it is clear his-
torically that the words "public acts" appearing in the clause
were originally intended to include legislative enactments." -
ceedings. Supreme Lodge v. Mleyer, 265 U. S. 30, 44 Sup. Ct. 432 (1924).
The clause likewise extends to attachment and insolvency proceedings.
Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307 (U. S. 1866), 7 Wall. 139 (U. S. 1868)
(attachment proceedings); Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215, 25 Sup. Ct. 625
(1905) (same); Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610 (U. S. 1872) (insolvency).
State courts, however, are not required to levy execution on or enforce
attachment proceedings on foreign judgments. AfeElmoyle v. Cohen, 13
Pet. 312 (U. S. 1839). Full faith and credit need not be given to foreign
judgments where the court rendering them had no jurisdiction over the
parties or subject matter. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1850)
(defendant not duly served with process) ; Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U. S.
457 (1873); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877); Reynolds v. Stockton,
140 U. S. 254, 11 Sup. Ct. 773 (1891) (judgment not responsive to the
issues); National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U. S. 257, 25 Sup. Ct. 70
(1904) (confession of judgment by one who had no authority to do so) ;
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct. 152 (1917);
Comment (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 579. And judgments penal in their nature
need not be given full faith and credit elsewhere. Wisconsin v. Pelican
Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. Ct. 1370 (1888); Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U. S. 657, 13 Sup. Ct. 224 (1892).
9 For discussion as to what is meant in the clause by "public acts" and
whether this includes statutes and decisional doctrine, see Dodd, op. cit.
supra note 5; Field, Judicial Notice of Pablic Acts Under the Fzdl Faith
and Credit Clause (1928) 12 MNINz. L. REv. 439; Langmaid, The Fudl Faith
and Credit Required for Public Acts (1929) 24 ILL. L. Rov. 383; Schofield,
Comment (1918) 13 ILL. L. REv. 43.
3
0 An early state case holds that the clause does refer to statutes but
that state courts are privileged on the basis of comity to refuse to entertain
actions thereunder. Crippen v. Laighton, 69 N. H. 540, 44 Atl. 538 (1899).
1 "It has been argued that the Act of 1804, supra note 7, refers to statutes
in the words "exemplifications of office books not appertaining to a court"
See Atchison, Topeka & Sante Fe Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, G4, 29 Sup.
Ct. 397, 399 (1909). It has also been pointed out that the last sentence
in the Act of 1790 added nothing to the clause itself and that although pro-
vision is made for legislation, the clause is in effect self-executing. Lang-
maid, op. cit. supra, note 9, at 389.
- As originally drafted by the Committee on Detail of the Constitutional
Convention the full faith and credit clause specifically included "acts of the
legislatures." 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONN'TI0 N (1911)
188. The Committee on Style changed this to "Public Acts." Ibid. 577.
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Moreover certain decisions of the Supreme Court declaring the
clause inapplicable to particular types or particular provisions of
statutes have indicated sub silentio that the clause does refer to
statutes in general and is self-executing. 13 It has been argued
that decisional doctrine is also included within the scope of the
full faith and credit clause 14 and certain cases seem to indicate
that the clause covers both foreign statutes and such doctrine.'5
For the early history of the clause see Costigan, The History of the Adop-
tion of Section I of Article IV of the United States Constitution (1904) 4
COL. L. REV. 470; Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause (1919) 28 YALTE L. J. 421 (suggesting additional legislation).
13 State courts are not required to give full faith and credit to provisions
in foreign wrongful death statutes restricting venue to the courts of the
state in which the statute was enacted. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
v. Sowers, supra note 11; Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233
U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587 (1914). Since in the Sowers case the petition
for review was grounded on an alleged violation of the full faith and credit
clause in refusing to follow the foreign restrictive provision, it has been
argued that the Supreme Court in granting the review admitted that an
alleged denial of full faith and credit to a fokeign statute raised a federal
question and that the case accordingly stands for the proposition that the
clause does extend to statutes and is self-executing. Langmaid, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 390. Likewise the rule that a mere misconstruction or mis-
application of a foreign statute does not raise a federal question might
well be regarded as an exception to the more general rule that statutes must
be given full faith and credit. Cf. Chicago and Alton R.R, v. Wiggins
Ferry Co., 119 U. S. 615, 7 Sup. Ct. 298 (1887); Banholzer v. New York
Life Insurance Co., 178 U. S. 402, 20 Sup. Ct. 972 (1900); Eastern Build-
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, 189 U. S. 122, 23 Sup. Ct. 527 (1903);
Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 35 Sup. Ct. 37 (1914);
Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1916); Pennsylvania In-
surance Co. v. Gold Issue Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 Sup. Ct. 344 (1917). The
same view may be taken with respect to the rule that the decision of the
forum is final in construing foreign statutes in the light of foreign consti-
tutions. Cf. Smithsonian Institute v. St. John, 214 U. S, 19, 29 Sup. Ct. 601
(1908).
14 Schofield, op. cit. supra note 9, at 56.
15 This is particularly true in certain fraternal benefit association and
insurance cases. Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U. S. 531, 35 Sup. Ct. 724(1915); Hartford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146, 38 Sup. Ct.
54 (1917); Modern Woodman v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544, 45 Sup. Ct. 389
(1925). These decisions are discussed infra: That these cases may be
considered in a class by themselves does not detract from the scope of the
clause, but only indicates the limited exercise by the Supreme Court of the
power conferred. Cf. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup.
Ct. 132 (1903), infra note 17. The most definite statement on the subject
is contained in a recent Connecticut case. Commonwealth Fuel Co. v. Mc-
Neil, 103 Conn. 390, 130 Atl. 794 (1925). Here an action was brought for
damages in Connecticut grounded on fraud perpetrated in New York. No
statute, but only New York common law doctrine, was involved. The court
gave relief saying: "Such an obligation, or right of action, as a general
rule, becomes vested, and will ced here precisely as if the obliga-
tion or right of action had A., risen in this jurisdiction. The full
If the full faith and credit clause requires recognition by the
states of the judgments, judicial proceedings, statutes and de-
cisional doctrine of sister states, the Supreme Court would seem
to possess the power to dictate to the states the rules of the con-
flict of laws for them to follow. Yet even conceding this broad
power, it is nevertheless quite unlikely that the Supreme Court
at the present time will make full use of it. Aside from com-
pelling states to accord full faith and credit to sister state judg-
ments and judicial proceedings, irrespective of the local policy of
the forum, 16 the Court has in no uncertain terms declared that it
will not interfere where a state court has merely misconstrued
or misapplied a sister state's statute or decisional law."' Thus
in Kryger v. Wilson I the Supreme Court held that a failure by
a state court to apply the statute of another state raised simply
faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires this." 103 Conn. at 406,
130 AtI. at 800.
The only ground for drawing a distinction between foreign statutory and
foreign decisional law might be to leave state courts some degree of discre-
tion in applying their own public policy where opposed to foreign "law."
This objection is overcome by the liberal attitude of the Supreme Court
with respect to state conflicts decisions, an attitude which may be charac-
terized as a general policy of "hands off."
16 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641 (1908) (action in
Mississippi to enforce Missouri judgment on wagering contract invalid by
laws of Mississippi where it was made); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449,
48 Sup. Ct. 142 (1928) (suit in Washington on judgment obtained in Ore-
gon on judgment debt previously barred in Washington by the Statute of
Limitations). In both cases it might be argued that the foreign judgments
to which credit was required to be given violated due process since they
enforced liabilities that had no existence where they were said to arise.
Cf. Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, supra note 1. These cases make judgment
recognition practically mandatory where the courts of sister states hadjurisdiction. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411, 40 Sup. Ct. 371
(1920) (overruling Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill.
369, 99 N. E. 619 (1912)) ; Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U. S. 142, 38 Sup. Ct.
452 (1917); Comment (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 264.
17 See cases cited szpra note 13. It has also been held that misapplica-
tion of the local common law of Pennsylvania by a Pennsylvania court in-
stead of the common law as interpreted in New York in the determination
of the validity of a stipulation exempting a carrier from liability raised no
federal question. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Hughes, suipra note 15.
A recent California case, where the court, on the ground of public policy,
refused to entertain an action based on a liability arising under an Hawai-
ian statute, assumes that state courts still have the constitutional privilege
to reject foreign statutory actions repugnant to local policy. Hudson v. Von
Hamm, 85 Cal. App. 323, 259 Pac. 374 (1927). See Day, J., in Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Sowers, supra note 11, at 67, 29 Sup. Ct. at 402:
"It is then the settled law of this court that in such statutory actions the.
law of the place is to govern in enforcing the right in another jurisdiction,
but such actions may be sustained in other jurisdictions when not inconsis-
tent with any local policy of the state where the suit is brought"
Is 242 U. S. 171, 37 Sup. Ct. 34 (1916) See Comment (1927) 26 YALu L. J.
1930] COMMENTS 295-
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a question of local common law "a matter with which this court
is not concerned." In this case it appeared that a contract was
made in Minnesota for the sale of land in North Dakota. The
vendor gave notice of the rescission of the contract in accordance
with a North Dakota statute and brought suit in North Dakota
to quiet title to the land. The vendee contended that the law of
the place where the contract was made should control the steps
necessary for rescission and that in so far as the North Dakota
court refused to apply a Minnesota statute dealing with rescission
there had been a deprivation of property without due process of
law. In rejecting this contention, the hands-offi policy of the
Supreme Court was expressed in such definite language as to
make it seem unlikely that any different result would have been
reached had the full faith and credit clause been invoked.""
In two lines of cases, however, there has been a deviation from
this policy as announced in Kryger v.. Wilson. The first group
involves the liability of stockholders in a foreign corporation as
fixed by its charter and the statutes and judicial decisions of the
state of incorporation. Converse v. Hamilton211 the earliest case,
held that, regardless of its own local policy, Wisconsin must
give full faith and credit to a Minnesota statute authorizing the
extra-territorial enforcement of stockholders' liability by the re-
ceiver of insolvent corporations incorporated in Minnesota.,'
While fundamentally the case is one involving recognition of the
particular judicial proceedings by which the receiver was ap-
pointed, the decision of the Supreme Court hinges on the word-
ing of the statute clothing the receiver with power to enforce
liability in other states.2 2 A similar result was reached in the
19 Ibid. 176, 37 Sup. Ct. at 35. Other cases lend support to this conten-
tion that in matters of purely local concern the Supreme Court will not
impose its own conflicts views on the state courts. Eastern Building &
Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, supra note 13; Johnson v. New York Life Insur-
ance Co., 187 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 194 (1903); Allen v. Alleghany Co.,
196 U. S. 458, 25 Sup. Ct. 311 (1905) ; Western Life Insurance Co. v. Rupp,
supra, note 13; Pennsylvania Insurance Co. v. Gold Issue Co., supra note 13;
Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U. S. 274, 48 Sup. Ct. 124 (1927).
20 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415 (1912).
21 Cf. Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640, 20 Sup. Ct. 606
(1900), where the refusal of a Rhode Island Court, on the grounds of pub-
lic policy, to entertain a suit by a judgment creditor of a Kansas corporation
against a Rhode Island stockholder for the enforcement of liability under
the laws of Kansas was held a violation of the full faith and credit clause.
This being a case of judgment recognition it did not go as far as the Con-
verse case. See Kuhn, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Statutes Imposing
Double Liability Upon Stockholders (1908) 17 YALE L. J. 457.
22 In an earlier case the Wisconsin court had held that the Minnesota stat-
ute did not authorize the receiver to proceed against stockholders outside of
the state. The Supreme Court said this was a fair interpretation of Minne-
sota statutes and "law" and that in any event Wisconsin could refuse to
entertain the suit on the basis of comity, its own interpretation of foreign
[Vol. 40
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later case of Mann v. Augedald ": when even the possibly erro-
neous construction put upon this same Minnesota statute by the
Minnesota courts was held binding on the courts of North Da-
kota.2 - And a like departure from the Supreme Court's cus-
tomary policy of hands-off is also to be found in Royal Arca um
v. Green25 and its successor, Modern Woodmen v. Mixer.20 In
both cases it was held that where a fraternal benefit society
endeavors to enforce assessments on members resident in other
states, such states must look to the law of the state of incorpora-
tion in deciding upon the validity of the assessments and give
full faith and credit to the statutes and decisional doctrine of
the incorporating state.
The second group of cases embraces controversies involving the
extra-territorial application of state statutes regulating insur-
ance. The Supreme Court held in New York Life Insumance Co.
v. Head 2 7 and New York Life Insurance Co. ,v. Dodge .9 that a
state cannot extend a non-forfeiture statute to a loan made
wholly outside the state, though executed in accordance with
law being conclusive. Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S. 335, 23 Sup. CL 558 (1902).
In the Converse case there was, of course, no room for interpretation, since
the statute expressly stated the receiver could sue outside the state. An
ordinary receiver appointed in a federal court in one state, being merely
the appointee of a court of equity, cannot sue in the federal courts in other
states. Sterrett v. Second National Bank, 248 U. S. 73, 39 Sup. Ct. 27
(1918); (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 805. But the Court said that the particu-
lar statute in Minnesota conferred upon the receiver the status of a quasi-
assignee for creditors and as such entitled him to sue anywhere. It is ap-
parent, however, that the real problem here was to find some means for
enforcing a liability from -which it would be inequitable to permit foreign
stockholders to escape. Cf. Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 144, 22 Sup. Ct.
52 (1901).
In this connection it may be noted that states can refuse to entertain an
action between two foreign corporations on a foreign judgment without
denying full faith and credit. The only clause that can be invoked, that
guaranteeing privileges and immunities to citizens, is not available to cor-
porations. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S.
373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92 (1903). Cf. Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, supra note 16.
See Langmaid, op. cit. supra note 9, at 416.
23247 U. S. 142, 38 Sup. Ct. 452 (1917).
24 The case involved recognition of a foreign order to sequestrate assets
and to levy an assessment given to the receiver of a foreign corporation.
The North Dakota court contended the statute which authorized the receiver
to proceed against stockholders in other states did not apply to this par-
ticular type of corporation.
25 Supra note 15.
2-Supra note 15. See Comment (1916) 25 YALE L. J. 324. A similar
case holds that a foreign decision upholding the validity of an assessment
made by an ordinary insurance company as well as the "powers" conferred
on the company by its charter, must be given full faith and credit. Hart-
ford Life Insurance Co. v. Barber, supra note 15.
27234 U. S. 149, 34 Sup. Ct. 879 (1914).
28 246 U. S. 357, 38 Sup. Ct. 337 (1918).
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certain provisions in the policy made within the state, without
violating the constitutional provision guaranteeing freedom of
contract.29  In the more recent case of Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken 30 the controversy concerned the choice of law applicable
to a policy of insurance issued in Texas but made in accordance
with a convertible provision in an earlier policy taken out in
Tennessee. A Texas court applied an onerous Texas statute im-
posing a heavy penalty for failure to pay the insurance within a
certain time after notice by the beneficiary. It was ruled by
the Supreme Court that the failure of the Texas court to apply
the law of Tennessee was a violation of the Constitution; but it
is not clear from the opinion whether the Court meant to rest
its decision upon the due process clause, the full faith and credit
clause, or both. In the principal case of Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick 31 a Texas court sought to apply to a fire insurance policy
taken out in Mexico a Texas statute declaring invalid any agree-
ment limiting the time within which suit could be brought on a
contract to less than two years. The Supreme Court concluded
that the application of the Texas statute to allow a suit within
two years, despite a stipulation in the contract that any action
to enforce a claim thereunder must be brought within a year af-
ter loss, was a violation of the due process clause. Although the
action had been brought originally against the Mexican insurance
companies, liability was imposed by garnishment proceedings
upon two New York companies which had reinsured the risk,
even though they had never even qualified to do business in
Texas and had appeared only through attorneys appointed by
the court. This extension of Texas law to reach the New York
companies was held distinctly unwarranted. The Court said:
"We need not consider how far the state may go in imposing
restrictions on the conduct of its own residents, and of foreign
29 In the latter case, and the former is on all fours with it, an insurance
policy was taken out in Missouri with a New York Company. In accord-
ance with a provision in. the policy a loan was made with the company in
New York. Premiums having lapsed, the paid-up value of the policy was
applied to satisfy the loan as provided by a New York statute. In a suit
by the beneficiary the Missouri court held such forfeiture invalid under a
Missouri statute prohibiting forfeiture after three years. The decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court. In a later case the policy contained
an express promise by the company to loan money within the limits of the
cash surrender value. A loan was later made in accordance with an appli-
cation made to the company in Missouri, which was accepted by the com-
pany in New York, and a check vas sent to the insured. The Supreme
Court here said the contract was made in Missouri and the non-forfeiture
statute applied. Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Liebing, 259 U. S. 209, 42
Sup. Ct. 467 (1922).
30 Supra note 6. See Notes (1925) 38 HARV. L. REV. 804; (1925) 20 ILL.
L. REV. 72.
3 Supra note 1.
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corporations which have received permission to do business with-
in its borders.... It may not abrogate the rights of parties
beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be
done within them." 32
While these two groups of cases indicate that the Supreme
Court has the power both to compel a state to accord full faith
and credit to the statutes and decisional doctrine of sister states
and to restrict a state's extra-territorial application of local
statutes, they furnish no basis for the conclusion that the Su-
preme Court has embarked upon a general policy of bringing
uniformity into state decisions on the conflict of laws.2 Krygcr
v. Wilson," has not been overruled, qualified or even regarded as
requiring explanation. On the other hand, there is no indication
that the Supreme Court will restrict its review of state conflicts
decisions to the two groups mentioned. A further exercise of
power is quite possible and perhaps, in some situations, advis-
able.3-
In general it would seem that the Supreme Court will impose
upon the state courts its own views of the conflict of laws only
when the interests involved in a particular case are broadly
national in scope. Thus where large nation-wide" businesses are
hampered by conflicting state rules and regulations, federal con-
frol is frequently necessary to bring about the uniformity essen-
tial to successful interstate operations. So also the security of
many large corporations may be jeopardized if stockholders not
residing in the state of incorporation are permitted to hide behind
state barriers and escape the liability which by their contracts of
membership they have agreed to assume. Likewse where assess-
ments are made short of full liability, stockholders residing in
the state of incorporation would be subjected to a greater burden
in order to compensate for the immunity enjoyed by stockholders
residing elsewhere. Such inequality of liability would be espe-
cially disastrous to the successful operation of a fraternal benefit
society where special assessments to meet losses are so frequently
32 50 Sup. Ct. at 342.
33 Such a proposition has been advanced, however, on the strength of
Aetna Insurance Co. v. Dunken, supra note 0. Dodd, op. cit. supra note
5, at 560; Note (1925) 38 HARV. L. REv. 804, 809.
31-Supra note 18. This case, which was decided after Converse v. Ham-
ilton, Royal Areanum v. Green and New York Life Insurance Co. %. Head,
mentioned none of these cases. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge,
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, Modern Woodmen v. Bixer and Home
Insurance Co. v. Dick, coming later, made no reference to it.
35 The extra-territorial use of the injunction raises an important national
problem. Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern R.R., 200 Ala. 432, 7G So.
364 (1917); Union Pacific R.R. v. Rule, 155 Bliun. 302, 193 N. W. 161
(1923); cf. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269 (1890).
See Comment (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 719. Of like importance is the recog-
nition of foreign judgments by confession. See Comment (1925) 34 Y,=
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made.36 In the case of insurance companies the broad national
scope of the problem is equally apparent. That the insurance
business was originally of but local significance is evidenced by
the case of Paul v. Virginia,37 holding that such business did not
constitute interstate commerce. But the subsequent nation-wide
expansion of insurance has evidently led the Supreme Court to
limit the regulatory powers of a state largely to transactions
taking place within its' borders.3 8
The distinction between conflict of laws cases involving matters
of broad national interest and those involving matters of mere
local concern has nowhere been expressly made by the Supreme
Court. In the Kryger case 39 and in the later case of Union Trust
Co. v. Grosman,40 however, the Court did declare that it would
not interfere in matters of purely local concern. From this defi-
nite expression of policy the inference may be drawn that inter-
ference is likely where the interests involved appeai national in
scope.41 Yet it may be distinctly unwise for the Court to state
L. J. 886; (1924). 38 HIARv. L. REv. 110. Interstate problems under the
Workmen's Compensation Acts, as well as questions involving the extra-
territorial effect of an automobile rental firm's liability for the injuries
inflicted by the le'ssee, might also be clarified by federal control. See Lang-
maid, op. cit. supra note 9, at 406.
36 It may be noted that in this first group of cases where the Supreme
Court has seen fit to impose its own views of the conflict of laws, a state,
by granting incorporation, acts to create rights and liabilities in a specified
group of persons and their successors. The situation thus resembles the
recognition of a foreign judgment or decree rather than of a general stat-
ute or general decisional law.
37 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868).
38 Between the one extreme where all the operative acts of a particular
transaction are performed within the state of the forum and the other,
illustrated in the instant case of Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, the Supreme
Court has drawn an undefined line beyond which a local state court cannot
go in regulating a national insurance business. The Head, Dodge and
Dunken cases fall outside of the limits of a state's control. Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Liebing, supra note 29, is a case falling just inside.
Compare the rule that states have no power to impose penalties on trans-
actions taking place wholly outside their territorial limits. Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 Sup. Ct. 42T (1897) ; St. Louis Cotton Compress
Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U. S. 346, 43 Sup. Ct. 125 (1922) (in form of tax);
Compania de Tabacos v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U. S. 87, 48
Sup. Ct. 100 (1927) (same).
39 Supra note 18.
40 245 U. S. 412, 38 Sup. Ct. 147 (1918). There a married woman, domi-
ciled in Texas, guaranteed her husband's note while she was temporarily
in Illinois, where a statute gave her capacity to contract. A federal court
sitting in Texas refused to allow the action on the contract on the ground
of local policy and the Supreme Court held that it was under a duty so to
act. Illinois law was not even considered. See also cases cited supra note
19.
41 As in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, mupra note 6. The de-
fendant, which failed to deliver a telegram sent from South Carolina to
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this affrmatively. Probably it is feared that any broad statement
would result in a flood of appeals such as were predicted as an
aftermath of the DunIken case.42  That this case indicated no
general intention to bring uniformity into state conflicts rules
is evidenced by the subsequent inactivity of the Supreme Court
bar. And yet the interference of the Court in that case and in
others of a similar nature indicates that more is involved than a
mere divergence in the views of the state and federal courts as
to the correct conflict of laws rules applicable.
the District of Columbia, was held liable for damages for mental anguish by
a South Carolina court applying a local statute. The Supreme Court held
that the failure to apply the common law as in force in the District of
Columbia both violated the Commerce Clause and interfered vith federal
control in the District of Columbia. The alternative ground somewhat
weakens the effect of the decision, but still it is a strong case for the prop-
osition that the court will not allow states to impose severe burdens on in-
terstate transactions by erroneous decisions in the conflict of laws.42Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. Rnv. 804, 809.
